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ON THE APPLICATION OF CERCLA TO
NONCORPORATE ENTITLES: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE REDWING DECISIONS

INTRODUCrION

Since the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 19801 ("CERCLA"),
environmental liability has become one of the most important considerations in deciding whether to own or operate a business on a
particular piece of land.2 The rationale that CERCLA is a remedial
statute has been used by courts to stretch the language of
CERCLA to the point where environmental liability attaches itself
to land. Consequently, anyone who owns, operates on, or develops
the land is likely to join the group of potentially responsible parties
("PRPs") who face joint, several, strict, and retroactive liability for
the entire cost of the environmental cleanup.3 Once found responsible for the contamination of a CERCLA facility or site, PRPs
face potentially unlimited liability, since liability is not based on
the price paid for property.4
The liability scheme imposed by CERCLA produces two clear
effects. First, because CERCLA liability can easily exceed the
value of the land, the best way to control this liability is to avoid

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994).
2. See Stephen L. Gordon & Bernard A. Weintraub, Brownfield Development Around
the Tri-State Area, N.Y. L., Oct. 15, 1996 at S2 (discussing how the uncertainty and
cost imposed by CERCLA cause buyers to be "extremely wary" of purchasing contaminated property).
3. See id. ("CERCLA's strict, joint and several, and retroactive liability for all owners
or operators of sites where hazardous substances have been disposed of is of concern to
any party that might acquire interest in contaminated property."); S. REP. No. 103-349, at

7 (1994).
4. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing how the structure of
CERCLA's strict liability scheme results in essentially unlimited liability).
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triggering it in the first place.5 Therefore, property with a questionable environmental history is routinely avoided by potential
owners or developers.This intentional avoidance has led to what is
often referred to as the "brownfield" problem: contaminated property becomes essentially untouchable by anyone because of the
liability for cleanup that has attached to it.6 The other effect of
CERCLA's broad coverage is that parties try to structure their
transactions to limit exposure to liability.7 Thus, contractual indemnity agreements (where a party remains a PRP but is indemnified
against CERCLA liability) are common, as is the use of business
entities, like corporations, that give liability protection to their
owners.8
While the options of avoiding the land in the first place or
only using land where contractual indemnity can be obtained are
common methods of minimizing CERCLA liability, the option of
using business entities offering limited liability protection is subject
to substantial uncertainty. The most common such entity historically, the corporation, has been the focus of much CERCLA litigation. Unfortunately, the protection the corporate form offers against
unlimited CERCLA liability varies widely by circuit.9 As for other

5. See generally Gordon & Weintraub, supra note 2, at S2.
6. See id. Gordon and Weintraub note:
The uncertainty over the extent to which a particular site is contaminated and
the standard of cleanliness that the applicable agency will require for the site's
remediation, together with the legendary cost of litigating under CERCLA has
led to a situation where buyers are extremely wary of purchasing brownfield
sites and where, in certain circumstances, it is less costly for an owner to
abandon a site rather than clean it up. Moreover, lenders shun such sites, concerned about the borrower's ability to repay the loan and about their own potential liability as a holder of interest.
Id. See also infra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the brownfields phenomenon).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 59 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir.
1995) (describing how the party indicating an interest in participating in the development
of contaminated property would only consider the investment if it could cap its potential
liability for environmental cleanup through the use of a subsidiary corporation).
8. See, e.g., Brian 0. Dolan, Comment, Misconceptions of ContractualIndemnification
Against CERCLA Liability: Judicial Abrogation of the Freedom to Contract, 42 CATH. U.
L. REV. 179, 187-88, 194 (1992) (discussing how parties have a strong incentive to enter
into indemnity agreements in an attempt to allocate liability under CERCLA, and how
such agreements do not relieve a party from CERCLA liability but do create an enforceable indemnity obligation that has the effect of relieving liability to the extent the indemnitor is financially solvent).
9. Compare, e.g., Cordova, 59 F.3d at 591 (holding that the liability protection of the
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entities, such as limited partnerships and limited liability companies
("LLCs"), there is a paucity of case law interpreting the application
of CERCLA in these contexts."0 The effect of the unsettled nature
of this application is that a party contemplating rehabilitation of
brownfield property faces substantial uncertainty as to whether the
liability protection of a business entity will provide an effective
shield from the dreaded CERCLA liability.
A recent district court decision, Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Saraland Apartments, Ltd.," and its appeal to the Eleventh Cir-

cuit,'2 may help resolve some of this uncertainty. These cases
consider, for the first time, the application of CERCLA to a limited partnership that developed a building on contaminated land. 3
For parties seeking to limit potential CERCLA liability, the important issues addressed in the Redwing cases are (1) the extent of
protection that limited partnerships offer limited partners and (2)
the acts for which the limited partners can lose their liability protection." In addition, however, both cases go beyond a simple
consideration of the limited partnership issues; they reach unique
interpretations of CERCLA that are important for both the answers
they provide and the questions they raise.'

corporate stockholders would be pierced only by showing fraud under state law) with
Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1225 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that federal common law, not state law, governs when corporate veil piercing is
justified under CERCLA). See also infra Part I.C. (discussing in detail the variation in the
application of CERCLA to the corporate form throughout the circuits).
10. See infra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the limited number of decisions interpreting how CERCLA applies to a limited partnership); MARK A. SARGENT &
WALTER D. SCHWiDETZKY, L nffrED
L! ,ruY COMPANY HANDBOOK § 3.08[2][d] (1996)
("The law of LLCs has had little time to develop. Until that development takes place,
there will be greater uncertainty involved in their use than in the use of more established
business vehicles"). For an explanation of how these alternative business entities provide
liability protection, see infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (providing background
information on how limited partnerships can offer liability protection); infra notes 236-38
and accompanying text (discussing the same topic for LLCs).
11. 875 F.Supp. 1545 (S.D.Ala. 1995) [hereinafter Redwing 1].
12. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, Ltd., 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996)
[hereinafter Redwing I1].
13. l at 1499-1500 n.12 (noting the "dearth of authority regarding CERCLA's interaction with state partnership law" and reporting that research revealed that the only previous
case "addressing a limited partner's liability under CERCLA" was a district court case
that was distinguishable because the procedural posture was such that the limited partnership issues were not carefully considered).
14. See generally infra Parts ll.B.-C. (discussing in detail Redwing I and H's analyses
about how CERCLA should apply to limited partnerships).
15. Id. (describing how the rulings of Redwing I and H modify existing common law
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The discussion of the Redwing cases that follows first presents
some background material in Part I on how CERCLA applies
generally and, more specifically, how it has been applied in the
corporate context. Since most of the same issues arise in the corporate and limited partnership context, and because the Redwing
courts analogize frequently to corporate rules, this background is
important. It leads to an appreciation of the significance of the
Redwing courts' choices between following established corporate
CERCLA law and creating new law tailored to the circumstances
of limited partnerships.
Part II presents the factual background of the Redwing cases
and the legal issues considered by the courts. This Part then analyzes the district court opinion, Redwing I, in detail. It highlights
the legal analysis of Senior District Court Judge William Brevard
Hand in considering how CERCLA should apply to limited partnerships, as well as several novel rulings that would limit the breadth
of CERCLA's coverage. 6
Part II continues with an analysis of the Redwing II decision.
Redwing II represents the first time a federal appellate court has
considered how CERCLA applies to parties having the liability
protection normally offered by a noncorporate entity. In addition to
solid analysis that gives limited partners protection from CERCLA
liability, the opinion contains miscellaneous rulings on CERCLA
implementation that appear to break new ground (even though the
court does not expressly recognize them as doing so). Since the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has been highly influential in

rules regarding the implementation of CERCLA).
16. While Judge Hand's limited partnership analysis was essentially affirmed on appeal,
his more novel interpretations were largely rejected. See infra notes 140-42 (discussing
some of Judge Hand's more unconventional rulings). Despite the novelty of his position,
it may prove influential. See Mark D. Tucker, 'Retroactive Liability' is Challenged, NAT'L
LJ., Oct. 14, 1996, at C1 (discussing Judge Hand's "unanticipated decision" in United
States v. Olin Corp., 927 F.Supp. 1502 (S.D.Ala. 1996), that CERCLA could not be applied retroactively). This decision caused an immediate uproar from the Department of
Justice, which warned that CERCLA would be crippled if this ruling were upheld, and
from Congressional Republicans, who proclaimed this ruling to be a watershed event in
reform of the statute. Id.
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this area, 7 both the entity law and the miscellaneous CERCLA
rulings of Redwing II are likely to have significant effect.
Finally, Part 1I considers the unresolved issues in Redwing II
and points out the limits of the decision as legal precedent. Part II
demonstrates that the Redwing II analysis ignores critical questions
of partnership succession in deciding the CERCLA responsibility of
the general partners, with the result that the treatment of general
partners remains unsettled. Then, the implications of Redwing II for
LLCs are discussed. While the limited partnership rulings can answer many implementation questions, others specific to LLCs remain unclear.
I. CERCLA IssuEs
A. Background
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 by a "lame duck" Congress,
partially as a response to high profile environmental contamination
cases like Love Canal and the Valley of the Drums."8 Passed in
haste and without much legislative history, CERCLA was intended
to provide the funding and means for government to clean up
environmental problems without delay. 9 It was apparently designed as much to rectify existing environmental problems as to
prevent future contamination." CERCLA's remedial character is
important to the implementation of the statute, which has generally
been interpreted broadly to ensure that its dual purpose (enabling
the EPA to respond quickly to environmental spills and holding the
parties responsible liable for the costs of cleanup) is met.2 ' Exam-

17. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 (lth Cir. 1990)
(holding a lender as a PRP under CERCLA because it had the authority to control the
debtor's property that was contaminated). This ruling shocked the lending industry and
was ultimately overruled by Congress through an amendment to CERCLA. See Asset
Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996, H.R. 3610,
104th Cong. § 2502.
18. See Dolan, supra note 8, at 179 n2.
19. See id. at 179-80.
20. See John M. Brown, Comment, Parent Corporation's Liability Under CERCLA
Section 107 for the Environmental Violations of Their Subsidiaries, 31 TULSA L.J. 819,
819 (1996) (quoting, in part, Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator
Analysis Under CERCLA: Finding Order in the Chaos of Pervasive Control, 72 WASH.

U. L.Q. 223, 229 (1994)).
21. See Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL.
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ples of this broad interpretation are that CERCLA liability has been
threatened for events that happened more than one hundred years
ago' and against such small nonprofit organizations as a Little
League baseball team. 23 CERCLA responsibility reaches so widely
that one third of all cleanup sites involve more than one hundred
PRPs, and another third involves between twenty and one hundred
PRPs.24
Although CERCLA has been in effect for more than fifteen
years, it remains controversial and many important issues concerning it remain unresolved.' The three most common complaints
against CERCLA were nicely summarized in the Superfund Reform
Act of 1994: (1) the liability system of CERCLA, applying jointly,
severally, strictly and retroactively, is unfair;, (2) in implementation,
CERCLA imposes heavy transaction costs; and (3) the liability
scheme is too broad and includes certain parties never intended to
be included.2 6 The effect of CERCLA has been to raise environmental issues to the forefront of all decisions concerning real estate.27 CERCLA's impact on real estate investment has been so
significant, in fact, that the implementation of the statute led to the

L. REV. 199, 273 (1996) (arguing that the remedial purpose canon of judicial interpretation heavily influences the application of CERCLA). Another way of stating the purpose
of CERCLA is to say Congress intended that the "polluter pays" instead of the public. ka
at 280.
22. See, e.g., Fishbein Family Partnership v. PPG Indus. Inc., 871 F.Supp. 764, 767
(D.N.J. 1994) (analyzing the potential application of CERCLA to the operation of a plant
from 1886 to 1889).
23. See S. REP. No. 103-349, at 40 (1994).
24. Id. at 40-41.
25. But cf Honorable James L. Oakes, Developments in Environmental Law: What to
Watch, 25 ENVTL. L. R. 10,308, 10,308 (1995) (arguing that environmental law is coming
of age, in spite of current variability and the impending counterrevolution based on the
new Supreme Court "takings" and "investment backed expectations" decisions, referencing
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (alluding to the concept of "investment backed expectations"); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (foreshadowing the takings litigation in Chief
Justice Rehnquist's introduction); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (setting the Court on the current path of its
understanding of "investment backed expectations"); and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S.Ct 2886 (1992) (fleshing out the definition of "investment backed expectations" in the context of the regulation of land use for environmental protection purposes)).
26. S. REP. No. 103-349, at 39-41 (1994).
27. See generally Rose-Marie T. Carlisle & Laura C. Johnson, The Impact of CERCLA
on Real Estate Transactions, 4 S.C. ENVTL. LJ. 129, 129 (1995) (discussing the issues
attorneys "must consider" in structuring real estate transactions to reduce CERCLA liability risk).
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coining of a new word, "brownfields," to describe vacant hazardous
waste sites that developers avoid because of the environmental
liability that attaches to the land.' While brownfields would still
exist without CERCLA in its present form, the potential unfairness,
cost, and broad scope of CERCLA have created a situation where,
from a market perspective, brownfields cannot compete with nonbrownfield (sometimes called "greenfield") property.29 This has
led many to remark that the only thing fair about CERCLA is that
it is unfair to everyone."
A significant aspect of the controversy surrounding CERCLA
arises not from the language of the statute itself, but from the
expansive judicial interpretation given it. To give effect to the
remedial purpose of the statute and to make "polluters pay," courts
have broadly construed the language in CERCLA. 31 This extension of liability has occurred without much intervention by Congress, making CERCLA as much judicially created law as it is
statutory law.32 Because of the heavy influence of judicial interpretation and the apparent low probability that Congress will clarify
the law on its own, individual decisions can immediately reshape
the contours of CERCLA law. 3
28. See E. Lynn Grayson & Stephen A.K. Palmer, The Brownfields Phenomenon: An
Analysis of Environmental, Economic, and Community Concerns, 25 ENViL. L.R. 10,337,
10,337-338 (1995).
29. See id. at 10,338 (noting that some experts estimate more than 500,000 sites nationwide show evidence of at least some hazardous waste contamination, with a total
potential cleanup price of as high as $650 billion).
30. See id. at 10,339.
31. See Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991)
("Mhe remedial nature of CERCLA's scheme requires the courts to interpret its provisions broadly to avoid frustrating the legislative purposes."). Examples of the broad judicial interpretation of CERCLA are that the phrase "owner and operator" really means
"owner or operator," and that simple movement of previously contaminated soil is a new
"disposal" that triggers a new round of CERCLA responsibility. See United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990); Tanglewood E. Homeowners v.
Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 1988).
32. Congress has substantively modified CERCLA to temper some of its perceived
harsh effects on only a few occasions. In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (the "SARA Amendments") that specified the right of
contribution among PRPs and clarified the innocent purchaser defense. See Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). In 1996, Congress clarified the application of CERCLA to
the activities of lenders, effectively overruling Fleet Factors. See Asset Conservation,
Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996, H.R. 3610, 104th Cong. §
2502. See also S. REP. No. 103-349, at 39-40 (1994) (accepting impliedly that the judicial interpretations of CERCLA, like its retroactivity, are settled legal issues).
33. See, e.g., supra note 17 (discussing how the Fleet Factors ruling shocked the
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B. Relevant CERCLA Provisions
CERCLA applies joint and several, strict, and retroactive lia-

bility to all parties responsible for a discharge of hazardous waste
at a facility. 4 Since all PRPs at the facility are considered joint
tortfeasors, the joint and several liability part of CERCLA is consistent with the common law of torts, which holds that, in the
absence of divisibility of the harm caused by joint tortfeasors, joint
and several liability applies.3 1 Strict liability under CERCLA arises from the language in the statute that, to give effect to the remedial purpose, defines liability as based only on the status of parties
and their relationship to the contaminated facility without reference
to relative fault.36 Finally, retroactive liability is injected into
CERCLA in part because of its remedial purpose and in part due
to language in the statute in the past tense, which suggests that
past events are relevant.37 Because it is the only implied liability
under CERCLA and because it can reach back well beyond the
relevant statute of limitations for events, retroactive liability is the
most controversial of the liability theories applying to responsible
parties under CERCLA.3"

lending industry and ultimately led to modification of CERCLA); Tucker, supra note 16,
at Cl (discussing the immediate reaction to a decision that ruled CERCLA was not retroactive).
34. See Gordon & Weintraub, supra note 2, at S2.
35. See Redwing 11, 94 F.3d at 1513 (applying the common law principles of joint and
several liability from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(A) (1965) to CERCLA).
36. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994). Because the relational link is the key
to the statute, CERCLA application frequently turns on ancillary legal issues, like ownership of real estate or contracts between PRPs, that indirectly define the relations between
PRPs and the contaminated facility. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (making a critical
element of the third party defense to CERCLA liability the absence of a contractual relationship with a PRP).
37. The argument for retroactivity is that, first, the remedial purpose of CERCLA can
only be met if the polluters of existing contaminated facilities are covered by the statute
(because otherwise the statute could not accomplish its objectives), and, second, that language in the statute that is in the past tense can only be given effect by applying
CERCLA retroactively. See United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F.Supp. 1502, 1507-11 (S.D.
Ala. 1996) (examining critically the common explanations for applying CERCLA retroactively).
38. See Tucker, supra note 16, at C1 (discussing the ongoing controversy over applying CERCLA retroactively).

19971

THE REDWING DECISIONS

1165

On the key issue of who is a PRP, CERCLA defines four
categories of responsible parties in § 9607(a):
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of the disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities,
incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release ... "
The four categories of CERCLA liability apply to any "person,"
where "person" is defined as "an individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial
entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission,
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.' '4° Combining the broad definition of person with the four types of responsibility, a wide range of individuals or entities may be directly responsible under CERCLA.
In practice, applying the four statutory types of responsibility is
not straightforward since it requires interpretation of sometimes
ambiguous language. The most frequently encountered interpretation
issue occurs in § 9607(a)(1), which only applies to present "owners
and operators."'" This language has always troubled courts because, interpreted literally, it means that current owners who do not
operate a business at the site and operators who do not own the
site at which they are operating would be freed from CERCLA
responsibility.42 Because of this perceived problem, from the earli-

39. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
40. § 9601(21).
41. See infra note 140 (presenting the Redwing I court's statutory interpretation of §

9607(a)(1)).
42. See Redwing I, 875 F.Supp. at 1555 (discussing the interpretational gymnastics
courts have employed to find that "and" should be read as "or").
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est interpretations of CERCLA this language has uniformly been
interpreted as meaning "owner or operator."'43 Another key interpretation issue in applying the statute is that §§ 9607(a)(2), (3),44
and (4) each apply to persons at the time of a disposal event.
Thus, the interpretation of "disposal" can be critical to whether a
person is covered by the statute.45 Other such interpretation questions abound in applying CERCLA.' Further, the liability structure of CERCLA cases (that once you are a PRP, you are strictly,
jointly, severally, and retroactively liable for the entire cost of the
cleanup) makes even small interpretation issues of major importance.
In applying the responsibility tests of § 9607(a), there are a
few statutory defenses. Section 9607(b) exempts from responsibility
persons who
[c]an establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and
the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war,
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or
omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant...
if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the
hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration
the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of
all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such

43. See id.
44. See §§ 9607(a)(2)-(4).
45. Compare Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568,
1573 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that CERCLA responsibility applies to persons who dig or
move already contaminated soil because this is a new disposal event) with infra note 141

(discussing the Redwing I creation of a voluntary/involuntary distinction for what it termed

"second-hand" disposals); infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text (discussing the
Redwing II court's rejection of the Redwing I rule and creation of its own test that does
not consider digging a disposal if the soil is put back in the same location).
46. See, e.g., infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text (discussing the wide variation
in standards for deciding when a person should be held as an operator).
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third party and the consequences that could foreseeably
result from such acts or omissions or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.47
In practice, defenses (1) and (2) are "rarely invoked," so the only
viable defense is the "'third-party' defense" of § 9607(b)(3).4
While this defense is designed to absolve persons who did not
cause any contamination and whose ties to the site occurred after
the contamination had already occurred, it can be hard to establish. 49 The first difficulty is that if a contractual arrangement exists either directly or indirectly between the person claiming the defense and any person responsible under CERCLA, the defense will
probably fail.50 For example, a current owner who bought from a
responsible person has a contractual relationship through the contract of sale and will lose the third party defense unless they can
establish the innocent purchaser defense. The second difficulty with
the third party defense is that it requires proof that due care was
used with respect to the hazardous substance already existing on
47. § 9607(b).
48. Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1507.
49. See ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SuPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE, §
5.5.A. (1992) ("Though defendants often assert the third-party defense, we are aware of
only a few reported cases in which a court has actually held that a CERCLA defendant
was not liable on this or a related basis.").
50. See § 9601 (35)(A) ("The term 'contractual relationship,' for the purpose of section
9607(b)(3) of this title includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title or possession . . . "). The only exception to finding a "contractual relationship" is the so-called "innocent purchaser defense" that excepts from coverage:
[R]eal property on which the facility concerned is located [that] was acquired
by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substances
on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances described in
clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the defendant by a preponderance
of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not
know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is
the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in or
at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a governmental entity which acquired the facility
by escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or
through the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(ii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has satisfied
the requirements of section 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of this title.
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the property and precautions were taken against the foreseeable
consequences of existing contamination. 1 Since there is wide latitude for interpretation as to the level of due care and precautions
required for the third party defense, courts have considerable flexibility as to deciding who qualifies. 2 Thus, while the third party
defense exists ostensibly to temper the harsh effects of CERCLA,
as implemented under the remedial purpose canon the third party
defense may not relieve many PRPs from CERCLA responsibility.
If a person is found responsible and not excused by the third
party defense, ultimate liability at the site will be determined by an
allocation of responsibility among PRPs. Section 9613(f) states that:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of
this title, during or following any civil action under section
9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this ttle.....
In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court determines are appropriate."
In application, the key words of § 9613(f) are "may allocate" and
"using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate." This language shows that courts are not required to award
contribution to a PRP who has paid for the costs of a cleanup.
Even if the court does award contribution, there is no defined set
of equitable factors to apply. 4 The end result of these vague implementation standards for contribution actions is that PRPs cannot
easily settle their share of liability with other PRPs because they
cannot predict how a court will ultimately allocate responsibility. 5

51. See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 49, at § 5.5.C. (arguing that a narrow interpretation of the "sole-cause" requirement leads courts to reject the third party defense for
parties who in any way contributed to the contamination and that courts require the defendant to offer evidence of due care or precautions against release).
52. See id. (arguing that courts have so narrowly construed the third party defense that
plaintiffs now take the position that "any act or omission of a party-however slight or
innocent-that contributes to the situation at the site bars a third-party from being the
'sole cause' of the problem and therefore bars assertion of the defense").
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1994).

54. See Redwing I at 1568-69 ("'[A] court may consider any factors appropriate to
balance the equities in the totality of the circumstances.... In any given case, a court
may consider several factors, a few factors, or only one determining factor . .. depending

on the totality of circumstances presented to the court.") (quoting Environmental Transportation Systems Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 509 (7th Cir. 1992)).
55. See S. REP. No. 103-349, at 40 (1994) (noting that the lack of a provision for
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There is one final caveat that must be added to the discussion
of how persons acquire their CERCLA responsibility. Because
different tests are applied to each and the terminology used by
courts tends to be confusing, care should be taken to distinguish
direct from indirect responsibility. 6 Thus, for the present analysis,
the terminology will be defined as follows: "Direct responsibility"
occurs when a person is found responsible as an owner, operator,
arranger, or transporter under the four sub-sections of § 9607(a);
and "indirect responsibility" occurs when a person incurs CERCLA
responsibility derivatively through a directly responsible person,
either through an indemnity agreement or when two separate persons are so interrelated that they are considered one person for
application of liability. 57 Using these definitions, there is a clear
difference between direct and indirect responsibility. Direct responsibility is established by a straightforward application of the statute
while indirect responsibility is established only by finding sufficient
links to a person who is already directly responsible.
The distinction between direct and indirect CERCLA liability is
frequently glossed over in applying the statute and this leads to
much of the confusion surrounding the implementation of the
law.58 This confusion is evidenced by frequent references to
CERCLA "owner" responsibility incurred when a corporate stockholder loses its liability protection and is thus considered one and
the same as the corporation.5 9 Technically, this is not "owner"
responsibility under CERCLA at all, but is instead a blending of
legally separate persons into one, whereupon the second person

letting small parties buy their way out of responsibility creates a problem for persons with
little responsibility who are forced to continue expensive litigation).
56. Cf. United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 59 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the operative test for liability of a corporate stockholder is the same for
both direct responsibility as an operator and indirect responsibility through piercing the
stockholder's corporate liability shield).
57. See Brown, supra note 20, at 823 (applying a similar distinction between direct

and indirect responsibility).
58. See, e.g., Cordova, 59 F.3d at 590 (lumping together the consideration of indirect
CERCLA responsibility as an owner with direct responsibility as an operator to reach the
result that both should be treated under the same standard).
59. See Gal A. Flesher & Dale S. Bryk, How to Incur Liability Without Really Trying: The Perils of Parenthood Under CERCLA, J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 4, 5 (1996) (describing how indirect responsibility tests involving "piercing the corporate veil" between a
parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are generally known as "owner" responsibility tests); see also infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text (discussing corporate
veil piercing under CERCLA in greater detail).
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becomes responsible for actions of the first person. In such a situation, the stockholder is responsible for the corporation's CERCLA
responsibilities, regardless of whether the corporation itself is considered an owner, operator, arranger, or transporter under §
9607(a).' For stockholders then, indirect responsibility for the
corporation's direct CERCLA responsibility could be based on any
of the four grounds in § 9607(a).6 1
There is similar confusion when courts consider whether a
stockholder is an operator under CERCLA based on acts taken in
controlling a responsible corporation. If a court finds the stockholder responsible as an operator, under the terminology here, this is a
direct application of the statute, even though the stockholder is
being held for indirect actions of control (the stockholder controlled
the corporation which in turn violated the statute).62 While this is
essentially derivative responsibility, as in the "owner" example, the
"operator" test considers a direct application of the statute to acts
that caused (albeit indirectly) contamination. Therefore, it differs
from the "owner" test that looks at law outside CERCLA to decide
if the stockholder's liability veil should be pierced. 6 Overall, this
distinction between direct and indirect liability is helpful to the
present analysis because it provides a theoretical framework for
separating the application of CERCLA to persons directly via the
statute and indirectly through legal processes like piercing the
corporate veil or successor liability.

60. See Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 4, 5. While this indirect responsibility of
the corporation may be derived from its status as an "owner," once the veil is pierced
and the corporations are treated as one, the CERCLA responsibility should not be limited
to § 9607(a)(1) owner responsibility.
61. An example might help clarify the differences between direct and indirect responsibiity. Consider a corporation that arranged with an unrelated facility to process the
corporation's waste oil. If the facility became a CERCLA site, the corporation could directly be held liable for only arranger or transporter responsibility, depending on the facts.
So a corporate stockholder who lost its liability shield and was considered one and the
same as the corporation would be indirectly responsible under §§ 9607(a)(3) or (4), but

not for owner liability under § 9607(a)(1). Thus, notwithstanding the current practice of
calling this "owner" responsibility, a better terminology is that the stockholder whose
liability shield is pierced is "indirectly" responsible for the corporation's CERCLA responsibility.
62. See Cordova, 59 F.3d at 593-94 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the statutory

separation between owner and operator means that a person can incur direct operator
responsibility regardless of interest in the facility because the operator test applies directly
to the person's actions).
63. See generally id.
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C. CERCLA Liability Applied to Business Entities
1. General Issues
When applying the CERCLA responsibility tests to a business
entity, like a corporation or a partnership, complications arise because the business entity has a legal existence of its own, apart
from its owners/investors.' As mentioned above, when there are
separate CERCLA "persons" (e.g., a corporation and its stockholders or managers), CERCLA can apply directly to each party, depending on its own actions.6' First, each person is tested independently of all others for direct responsibility. Then, whenever there
are related parties, like an investor and the entity he owns, indirect
responsibility could apply depending on whether one party is
charged with liability for the acts of the other.' Therefore, in
analyzing how CERCLA applies to business entities and related
persons (owners, management or agents), two threshold questions
are (1) whether any of the persons can be found directly responsible for their own acts, and (2) whether any of the persons are
indirectly responsible for another person who is directly responsible.
2. CERCLA as Applied to Corporations
Almost all of the cases that have applied CERCLA to business
entities have involved a subsidiary corporation that is whollyowned by a parent corporation. The issues are usually similar,
namely, whether the parent corporation can be held, either directly
or indirectly for the CERCLA responsibility of their wholly-owned
subsidiary.6 7 Although the opinions are sometimes muddled, the

64. See generally Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 4-5. As they note:
Parent companies are generally not responsible for the liabilities of their subsidiaries. In the environmental arena, however, where the statutory provisions are
broadly drafted and often vague, and where public policy favors imposing liability on those who benefit from an activity rather than leaving the liability
with taxpayers, the general rule against holding a parent responsible for the sins
of its child has been altered, sometimes radically, by court decisions.
Id. at 4.
65. See Cordova, 59 F.3d at 593-94 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (applying a separate analysis
to subsidiary corporation and to the parent corporation).
66. See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text (discussing how a stockholder can be
indirectly responsible for the acts of a corporation through a "piercing" of the corporate
veil).
67. See, e.g., Cordova, 59 F.3d at 587-88 (where two of the defendants are parent
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first question usually asked relates to whether the parent corporation can be held indirectly responsible because the corporate veil
should be pierced under the appropriate test. From there, the analysis usually proceeds to a consideration of whether the parent corporation can be held directly responsible as an owner, operator, arranger, or transporter under § 9607(a).
In cases considering the responsibility of a parent corporation
for its subsidiary, important underlying issues are (1) the extent to
which state entity law should guide the analysis, (2) whether to
develop or apply a federal common law, and (3) how the remedial
purpose of CERCLA should be incorporated into the selected legal
standards. 68 This flexibility to combine state law with new or existing federal common law, particularly when flavored by the remedial goals of CERCLA, results in varied applications of the statute
to parent and subsidiary corporations.69 This variation is important
for the present analysis because it demonstrates how courts can
reach diametrically opposed results depending on judicial views of
federalism and the implications of the remedial purpose of
CERCLA. Further, the variation in court opinions provides a useful
background for understanding the choices the Redwing I and I
courts made and the alternatives they rejected."

corporations who are allegedly responsible under CERCLA for the actions of their respective wholly owned subsidiary corporations).
68. See generally Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 5-7 (discussing the difficulties in
determining the appropriate legal standards to apply).
69. See id.
70. The majority in Cordova noted:
[The parent corporation] indicated an interest on the condition that it could cap
its potential liability for environmental cleanup, which it sought to accomplish
through the negotiation of the agreement with the MDNR and the use of subsidiaries. To scuttle such sensible and legitimate precautions . . . would actually
contravene the public interest by discouraging businesses from becoming involved in such projects.
59 F.3d at 590. The Cordova dissent disagreed, stating- "[The parent corporation] admits
that Cordova . . . was established solely as a facade, to avoid any legal obligation to pay
for further environmental cleanup at the site. Under Michigan law, their admission is
sufficient to justify piercing the corporate veil." 59 F.3d at 598 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
The federalism issue arises because there is a tension between state law, which generally governs the operation of corporations, and the federal common law that has developed surrounding CERCLA. See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's guidelines on when state law is adequate and when federal common law
should be developed).
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a. Indirect Responsibility of Corporate Stockholder
In considering the issue of whether a parent is indirectly responsible for the acts of its subsidiary corporation, courts apply a
test known as "piercing the corporate veil."' This common law
test effectively decides when equity or justice requires that the
corporate form be ignored and the stockholder be considered indistinguishable from the corporation.72 It is important to note that
veil piercing is a limited exception to the general rule of corporate
law that the stockholder is an independent legal entity who does
not own the assets that the corporation owns and whose only financial risk in the corporation is the consideration paid for
stock.73
Even though it is clear that a parent corporation's indirect
responsibility is measured by the appropriate veil-piercing test, in
practice, the application of this test is muddled. Some courts apply
the applicable state law test while others have developed a federal
common law test. Further, all variations of the test are multi-factored; as applied they have produced little guidance as to what is
covered. 7 4 The net effect of this variability and the use of multifactor tests is that there is uncertainty about when the corporate
veil will be pierced in a particular factual setting where some
factors are met and others are not. This uncertainty, in the context
71. As discussed above, courts and commentators generally refer to veil piercing as a
test of "owner" responsibility, even though a more accurate description would be that it
tests indirect responsibility for the corporation's responsibility, however derived. See supra
notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
72. See Brown, supra note 20, at 823-24. Brown notes:

[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and
until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of the legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons.
L (quoting United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247 (E.D. Wis.

1905)).
73. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 20, at 832.

74. See Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 5.As they write:
What circumstances warrant piercing a corporation's veil is generally a question
of state law. CERCLA is a federal statute, however, and in the absence of

clear congressional intent that state law should be applied, a number of courts
have determined that the application of various inconsistent state laws would

significantly threaten the overarching need for uniformity in the nation's environmental protection standards.
Id; see infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text (discussing the rules for determining

when to defer to state law and when to create federal common law).
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of the remedial nature of CERCLA, gives courts tremendous flexibility.

As for the choice of federal or state veil-piercing law, while it
has been noted that the federal veil-piercing standard generally
"gives less respect to the corporate form [than state law]," 75 there
are states where the common law veil-piercing test is similar to the
federal common law standard.7 6 Under the most commonly cited
federal standard, a court is likely to pierce the veil:
"[I]n the interest of public convenience, fairness and equity," if there was, in descending order of importance: "(1)
inadequate capitalization in light of the purposes for which
the corporation was organized, (2) extensive or pervasive
control by shareholder or shareholders, (3) intermingling of
the corporation's properties or accounts with those of its
owner, (4) failure to observe corporate formalities and
separateness, (5) siphoning of funds from the corporation,
(6) absence of corporate records, and (7) nonfunctioning
officers or directors."77
However, as an example of the uncertainty surrounding the
process of veil piercing, when the Acushnet River court applied
these factors, they found that even though several factors pointed
toward piercing the veil, enough factors pointed toward respecting
the veil.78 The only true rule that can be distilled from the case is

75. Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 5 (quoting United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.,
724 F.Supp. 15, 23 (D.R.I. 1989)).
76. See, e.g., Cordova, 59 F.3d at 597 (Ryan, J., dissenting). As Justice Ryan stated in
dissent
Indeed, this court has observed, in dicta to be sure, that Michigan law permits
veil piercing upon a showing of any of the following: (a) a corporation and
shareholders have complete identity of interests; (b) the corporation is a mere
instrumentality of the shareholders; (c) the corporation is a devise to avoid a
legal obligation; or (d) the corporation is used to defeat public convenience,
justify a wrong, protect or defend a crime.
Il
77. Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 6 (quoting In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp.
22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987) (citations omitted)):
78. See Acushnet River, 675 F.Supp. at 33-35. The factors supporting upholding the
corporate veil under this test were: (i) the subsidiary's net worth increased substantially
during the parent's ownership; (ii) the parent never paid itself a dividend; (iii) the subsidiary negotiated its own contracts, loans, budgets, marketing, sales, and developed its
own customers; (iv) the subsidiary controlled the hiring and firing of employees; (v) the
subsidiary maintained its own financial records; and (vi) the subsidiary conducted regular
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that if exactly the same facts were presented the court should uphold the veil. But there is little guidance as to what would be
required to pierce the veil. A court intent on piercing (e.g., to
uphold CERCLA's remedial purpose) would have plenty of flexibility to decide that enough had been shown.
Although there are many more subtleties to corporate veil
piercing depending on the jurisdiction and the type of test, the
important point is that the indirect responsibility of a stockholder is
measured by a multi-factor analysis to decide if the appropriate
standard is met.7 9 This standard, as well as the list of factors, in
turn depends on whether state or federal veil piercing law is
used.8" Finally, once the liability veil is successfully pierced, the
stockholder is no longer treated as a separate entity from the corporation." Therefore, in a CERCLA analysis, the effect of piercresponsibility of the
ing the corporate veil is that the CERCLA
82
corporation is applied to the stockholder.
b. Direct Responsibility of Corporate Stockholder
Regardless of whether the stockholder is responsible under the
veil-piercing test, courts have held stockholders directly responsible
under § 9607(a)(1) as a present operator, or under § 9607(a)(2) as

board meetings. See Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 6-7 (quoting and summarizing
Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 35).
On the other hand, factors suggesting the corporate veil should be pierced were: (i)
the parent formed the subsidiary "with an eye towards limiting its own liability for environmental contamination;" (ii) the parent's cash management system applied to the subsid(iii) the parent guaranteed the subsidiary's loans; (iv) the parent maintained authority
iary;
to approve large capital expenditures by the subsidiary; (v) the parent influenced the
subsidiary's accounting procedures; (vi) the subsidiary regularly reported financial results to
the parent; (vii) the subsidiary's logo included the parent's initials; and (viii) the parent's
umbrella insurance covered the subsidiary. Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 6 (quoting
and summarizing Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 34).
79. See generally Brown, supra note 20, at 832-34 (discussing in detail corporate veil
piercing and giving composite lists of factors that have been applied in state and federal
veil-piercing tests).
80. Veil-piercing analyses by state courts often follow the same approach as the federal
court in Acushnet River, but often require more to pierce the corporate veil. See, e.g,
Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 5 (noting that "[p]ersuading a Delaware court to disregard a corporate entity is a difficult task," and while "[u]nder Delaware law, the alter ego
does . . . require an
theory of liability does not require a showing of fraud . . . [i]t
"overall element of injustice or unfairness"). Id.
81. See, e.g., supra note 72.
82. See Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 5 (describing shareholder responsibility
under CERCLA).
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an "operator," if the stockholder exerts sufficient control over the
corporation." Again, the cases generally consider the par-

ent/subsidiary relationship (where the stockholder is the corporate
parent). The issue is whether there is a theory of liability by which

the parent can be held responsible under CERCLA.14 The principle difference between this attempt to pin direct responsibility on
the parent corporation as an operator and indirect corporate veil
piercing is that the operator responsibility question is generally
applied independently as a backup theory in case veil piercing
fails.85
The rationale for treating a corporate parent as an "operator"
under CERCLA is that when corporations are closely linked, many
decisions of the subsidiary, especially those related to hazardous
materials, are made by the parent.8 6 Thus, the critical determination in finding operator liability is the degree of the stockholder's
involvement in running or controlling the corporation. 7 All tests
of operator responsibility endorsed by federal appellate courts reflect this concern with acts of control, 8 however, there is a wide
divergence in the appropriate standard to apply since some courts
look at actual acts of control, while other courts focus on the mere

authority to control.
The majority rule for operator liability is the "actual control"
standard, where a stockholder will only be held liable for the
corporation's environmental violations when there is evidence of

83. See, e.g., Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1503. The appellate court noted:
In the corporate context, courts have reasoned that an officer or a shareholder
in a corporation may be directly liable under CERCLA if the officer or shareholder in fact operated the facility at issue. This is so despite the traditional
corporate law principle that officers, shareholders, and employees are not liable
for the acts of the corporation.
Id. (citations omitted).
84. See, e.g., Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir.
1993) (discussing the level of control necessary to trigger operator liability).
85. See Brown, supra note 20, at 837-38 (arguing that courts should recognize that
there is a difference between indirect corporate veil piercing and direct application of
operator responsibility).
86. See generally Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 8 (articulating the rationale for
parent operator liability).
87. See id. ("Most courts will evaluate the level of actual control the parent has over
the management of the subsidiary, giving particular attention to environmental operations
and decision-making.").
88. See id. (discussing how most of the circuits have addressed this issue and all but
one of these adopted control tests as the test of operator responsibility).
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"substantial control" by the stockholder over the corporation.89
Under this standard, mere ownership as an investor or having general authority or ability to control the corporation is not enough. 90
Instead, actual involvement in day-to-day operations and in the
decision making process of the corporation are usually required.9
A leading case applying the "actual control" test to the parent/subsidiary relationship described the test as follows:
Under the actual control standard, while the longstanding
rule of limited liability in the corporate context remains the
background norm, a corporation cannot hide behind the
corporate form to escape liability in those instances where
it played an active role in the management of a corporation
responsible for environmental wrongdoing.92
Applying the test to the facts before them, the Lansford-Coaldale
court noted significant separations between the corporations in
question. The court remanded the case, however, for a factual
determination on this issue because it was troubled by the fact that
there were common officers in the corporations, that one of the
officers signed an environmental consent order, and that the internal organization chart described the two corporations as operating
as one entity.93 These facts were sufficient to raise the question of
whether the stockholder participated in enough decisions related to
business, and in particular to hazardous waste, to be directly held
under CERCLA as an operator.
In contrast to the "actual control" standard, a much broader test
of operator liability is known as the "ability to control" standard. 94 In effect, this test applies operator liability to a stockholder who had the capability to control the corporation, even if this

89. See, e.g., Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221
(3d. Cir. 1993).
90. See id.
91. See Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d at 1110 (11th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the test for operator responsibility required that a parent corporation "exer-

cise[] actual and pervasive control of the subsidiary to the extent of actually involving
itself in daily operations of the subsidiary").
92. Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221.
93. See Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 9-10 (describing the Lansford-Coaldale
holding).
94. See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992)
(adopting the ability to control standard under CERCLA).
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capability was never exercised. 95 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this test because it applies CERCLA responsibility to

"a party who possessed the authority to abate the damage caused
by the disposal of hazardous substances but who declined to actu96
ally exercise that authority by undertaking efforts at a cleanup."
While this decision is only a minority rule, several courts have
commented on the validity of this test, apparently emphasizing its
consideration of the critical issue of who had influence over the
handling of hazardous substances.97

To further complicate things, there are yet other interpretations
of the standard for applying operator responsibility. For example,
the Eighth Circuit has rejected the Nurad test in favor of a test
that requires the stockholder to have had authority for hazardous
waste decisions and to have actually exercised that authority.9 8
This test is apparently stricter than the general actual control test
(or ability to control test) because it requires actual control over
only one particular issue, hazardous waste handling. Also, the Fifth
Circuit has decided that a stockholder cannot be considered an

95. See id.
96. Id. at 842.
97. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338,
1341-42 (9th Cir. 1992) (suggesting the ability to control test applies); Flesher & Bryk,
supra note 59, at 10 (discussing the Tenth Circuit's express refusal to choose between the
actual control test and the ability to control test in FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, 998
F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993) and quoting the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Northeastern
is the authority to
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) ("-lit
control the handling and disposal of hazardous substances that is critical under the statutory scheme.")). But see, e.g, Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1221. In rejecting the "authority
to control" test, the Lansford-Coaldale court held:
[A] rule which imposes liability on a corporation which never exercised its
general authority over its subsidiary or sister corporation may unduly penalize
the corporation for a decision by that corporation to benefit from one of the
well-recognized and salutary purposes of the corporate form: specialization of
management.
Id. (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. C-. L. REV. 89, 90-94 (1985)).
98. See United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 73 (1995). The Gurley court held[A]n individual may not be held liable as an "operator" under § 9607(a)(2)
unless he or she (1) had authority to determine whether hazardous wastes
would be disposed of and to determine the method of disposal and (2) actually
exercised that authority, either by personally performing the tasks necessary to
dispose of the hazardous wastes or by directing others to perform those tasks.
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"operator" unless the corporate veil is pierced." The rationale for
this ruling was that Congress could have included language within
CERCLA to reach persons who controlled an entity, and without
such language, the basic tenets of corporate law should control 30°
In summary, there is wide variation in the standard used to
apply operator responsibility to a corporate stockholder. -Moreover,
even when the applicable test is certain, the application of that test
is conducted through a factual determination of whether there are
enough acts of control. Thus, courts still have plenty of flexibility
to interpret facts in accordance with their personal views of
CERCLA.10 '
H-.REDWING DEcIsIoNs
A. Factual Background and Legal Issues Presented
Redwing I and Redwing II concern property in Saraland, Alabama where an apartment complex was built on the site of a trucking terminal.10 2 From 1961 to 1972, Redwing Carriers, Inc.
("Redwing") owned and operated a trucking terminal at the site
and was in the business of hauling materials used in construction
and other industries." 3 Trucks at the terminal carried asphalt, tail
oil, and molten sulphur;, after carrying their loads the trucks were
cleaned out at the terminal and the waste water was drained onto
the property."°4 Excess asphalt was also dumped directly into pits
dug in the ground. 0 5 The combined result of this contamination
was that a "black, tar-like toxic substance" was formed, apparently
just beneath the surface of the land.' 6
Redwing sold the trucking terminal site to Harrington, Inc. in
1971, who then sold it to Apartments, Inc. later that year.1' 7 In

99. See Joslyn Mfg. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990).
100. See Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 10 (interpreting the holding of Joslyn Manufacturing).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 59 F.3d 584, 590, 597 (6th Cir.

1995) (deciding to adopt the strict Fifth Circuit veil-piercing operator rule, while the dissent would have applied the more prevalent actual control test).
102. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1494.
103. See id.

104. See id.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1494-95.
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1973, Apartments, Inc. sold the property to a partnership, Saraland
Apartments, Ltd., ("Saraland I"), who hired Meador Contracting
Company ("Meador") to build an apartment complex on the site,
which was completed in 1974.08 In 1980, Saraland I hired

Marcrum Management Company ("Marcrum") as its management
agent for -the property."° Finally, in the last transaction of interest, a group of investors bought out the original partners in
Saraland I in October 1984, creating a new limited partnership with
the same name ("Saraland IH").10 In this transaction, Robert Coit
and Roar Company ("Roar") purchased a one percent general partnership interest in Saraland I, and Hutton Advantaged Properties,
Ltd. and H/R Special Limited Partnership ("Hutton") purchased the
remaining ninety-nine percent of Saraland I as limited partners."'
After Redwing sold the land to the succession of owners in
1971, and during the construction of the apartments that were
completed by 1974, the preexisting contamination of the site was

108. See id. The partners in the original Saraland partnership were Ralph C. Harrington,
A.B. Meador, E.L. MacDonald, and W.D. Bolton. See id. Saraland partner A.B. Meador
was also the president of the Meador Contracting Company. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.at 1495. Under partnership law, Saraland I is considered a separate legal
entity and all partners are general partners who do not directly own the assets the partnership owns, but are ultimately jointly and severally liable for the liabilities of the partnership. See UNIF. PARTNERsHI AcT § 26 (1914) ("UPA") ("A partner's interest in the
partnership is his share of the profits and surplus, and the same is personal property.");
id. § 15 ("All partners are liable (a) jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the
partnership under sections 13 and 14. (b) Jointly and severally for all other debts and
obligations of the partnership. . ").
111. See Redwing I1,94 F.3d at 1495. In the transaction that converted Saraland I, the
ordinary partnership, into Saraland H, the limited partnership, there presumably was a sale
of the partnership interests of the Saraland I partners to the incoming partners. Under
established partnership law, whenever a partner ceases to be associated with the partnership it effects a dissolution of this partnership. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACr § 29 (1914)
("The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the partners caused by
any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on . . . of the business."). Thus: the
effect of the sale of partnership interests was that the Saraland I partnership dissolved and
a new partnership, Saraland H, was formed as a limited partnership by Hutton and Roar,
the purchasers of interests in the partnership. See generally REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERsun' ACT §§ 101, 303, 403 (1976) ("RULPA") (defining a limited partnership as a partnership where there is at least one general partner, who has the liabilities of a partner in
a partnership without limited partners, and at least one limited partner, who is not liable
for the obligations of the limited partnership unless he or she takes certain acts in controlling the business). Note that while RULPA was substantially amended in 1985, Alabama adopted it in 1984 and follows the 1976 version. See infra notes 125, 127, 159 and
accompanying text.
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apparently not noticed by the new owners.'
However, Saraland
I did become aware of tar seeping to the surface in 1977, and Department of Housing and Urban Development inspections in 1983
and 1984 cited tar in various places in the complex."' Other
events related to the contamination were the repaving of the parking lot in 1986, and maintenance work on an underground gas line
in 1991, where soil was dug out and eventually replaced.'
After the property was converted from industrial use to residential apartments, the EPA started monitoring contamination at the
property." 5 Since Redwing was clearly responsible for some, if
not all, of the contamination, the EPA focused its efforts on
Redwing, although it appears that other parties, like Saraland II,
were also named as PRPs." 6 In 1985, Redwing entered into an
administrative consent order with the EPA agreeing to monitor the
former trucking terminal." 7 Redwing then bound themselves to
clean up the site in a second consent order with the EPA in

1990.118
After paying $1.9 million in CERCLA costs, Redwing brought
a contribution action against other PRPs that ultimately led to
Redwing I and Redwing IL" 9 *In this lawsuit, the defendants were
Saraland II, Roar, Hutton, Marcrum, and Meador. 20 The theories
112. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1494-95.
113. See id. (noting that by the time of the sale to the new partners in 1984, residents
of the development had been complaining about tar problems for several years).
114. See id. at 1510. The repaving and pipeline work create a critical issue as to
whether some parties can be held as responsible parties. If those works are considered a
new act of disposal, a new round of CERCLA responsibility attaches to those parties
deemed to be owners and operators at the time the events occurred. See infra note 141
(discussing the creation of a "second-hand" disposal rule in Redwing 1); infra notes 20001 and accompanying text (discussing the Redwing 11 theory that, without proof that the
soil was not replaced where it originated, there is no new disposal event).
115. See Redwing 11, 94 F.3d at 1495.
116. See Redwing Carrier Source Soil Removal Near, 10 SuPERFutN WEEaK 38, Sept.
30, 1996, available in WL 11485982 (reporting that both Redwing and Saraland II are
parties to EPA orders with respect to the cleanup at the facility, the next phase of which
is estimated to cost $3 million).
117. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1495.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. The notable part of this list of defendants is not who it includes, but who
it omits, namely, Saraland I, and its partners. The absence of Saraland I is understandable
since it was apparently dissolved upon the transfer of the partnership interests. But the
partners in Saraland I were presumably liable for the responsibilities of Saraland I from
1973 to 1984 under partnership law, and so would be indirectly responsible for any
CERCLA responsibility incurred during that time. And since CERCLA responsibility can-

1182

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1157

of responsibility alleged were: (1) that Saraland II, Roar, Hutton,

and Marcrum are responsible under § 9607(a)(1) as present owners
or operators; (2) that Saraland II, Roar, Hutton, and Marcrum are
responsible under § 9607(a)(2) as persons who were owners or
operators at the time of disposal of hazardous substances that occurred in the 1986 repaving and the 1991 pipeline maintenance;
and (3) that all the defendants are responsible as persons who
arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances under §
9607(a)(3).12 ' Each of the defendant's counterclaimed against all
the others for contribution, and all parties filed for summary judgment.')
B. District Court Opinion
In Redwing I, Senior District Court Judge William Brevard
Hand combined solid analysis of how CERCLA should apply to
limited partnerships with newly created interpretations of
CERCLA.'" A simple summary of his ruling is that Redwing is
not entitled to contribution from any of the defendants, even
though they may have owned, operated, or developed the property,
because each is either not responsible under CERCLA or is equitably excused from paying contribution.12 4 While holding the major

not be discharged once it attaches, these partners are PRPs not named in the lawsuit. See
Dolan, supra note 8, at 187-88, 194 (discussing how indemnification agreements may shift
but not relieve CERCLA liability). Other unnamed PRPs are Harrington, Inc. and Apartments, Inc., who each briefly owned the property in 1971 and who therefore could be
responsible if any disposal occurred during their tenure.
121. See Redwing I, 875 F.Supp. at 1554-55.
122. See id. Since all parties have moved for summary judgment, the procedural posture
of Redwing I and Redwing II is that the appellate court may review the district court's
decision de novo to decide if there are genuine issues of any material fact or if judgment
may be granted as a matter of law. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1495.
123. Judge Hand has recently been the focus of much commentary for his ruling in

United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F.Supp. 1502 (S.D.Ala. 1996) that CERCLA should not
apply retroactively. See Tucker, supra note 16, at C1 (describing the Olin opinion and
associated commentary).
124. See Redwing I, 875 F.Supp. at 1569. Judge Hand writes:
After extensive review of the documents submitted, the court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude only that, among the parties before the court, the
disposal of hazardous substances at the site results entirely from Redwing's
actions, and that among these parties, justice requires Redwing bear all, and the
defendants bear none, of the response costs.
Id. Somewhat paradoxically however, Redwing would not even be a party to the litigation
under Judge Hand's recent ruling that CERCLA should not apply retroactively; Judge
Hand's argument about justice requiring Redwing to bear all could not occur under Olin.
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polluter entirely responsible is completely consistent with the remedial purpose of CERCLA, the following analysis demonstrates that
Judge Hand flaunts established CERCLA law on several points to
reach this result. Thus, Redwing I is interesting for its lessons on
how a noncorporate entity should be treated under CERCLA, as
well as for its new rulings by a jurist gaining renown for controversial CERCLA interpretations.
On the application of CERCLA to a noncorporate entity, Judge
Hand first considered the issues of whether the limited partners,
Hutton, could be held responsible as an owner of Saraland II under
either § 9607(a)(1) or § 9607(a)(2). Finding that state limited partnership law controlled the determination of what kind of interest
the limited partners held, Judge Hand ruled that the Hutton limited
partners were not liable as owners. This determination was compelled by the fact that under Alabama limited partnership law,
limited partners own only an interest in the partnership, but do not
own what the partnership owns." 5 In other words, the limited
partners own only personal property (an intangible interest in the
profits and losses of the partnership), and cannot therefore be considered owners directly under CERCLA. 26
Once it is established that state law limiting the limited
partners' liability is to be respected, the next question is whether
the limited partners can be found indirectly responsible through a
piercing of their liability veil. On this point, Judge Hand ruled that
the indirect responsibility of limited partners was governed by state
limited partnership law.

See generally Tucker, supra note 16, at Cl.
125. See Redwing I, 875 F.Supp at 1557. This is the general rule for limited partnerships-that the limited partner is not responsible for any of the limited partnership's obligations. For example, RULPA provides:
[A] limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership
unless he is also a general partner or, in addition to the exercise of his rights
and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business.
However, if the limited partner's participation in the control of the business is
not substantially the same as the exercise of the powers of a general partner,
he is liable only to persons who transact business with the limited partnership

with actual knowledge of his participation in control.
REvnsED UNi.
LTD. PARTNERSHip ACT § 303(a) (1976). Note that Alabama adopted
RULPA in 1984, and apparently does not follow amendments to the rules regarding limited partners' participation in control adopted in 1985. See infra notes 127, 159 and accompanying text.
126. This result is also consistent with the general corporate rule that the stockholder
does not own what the corporation owns. See, e.g., supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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Whether the limited partners would be liable for any obligations of the limited partnership is a different issue, one
which depends on limited-partnership law, not on
CERCLA. A limited partner may be liable to a third party
for the obligations of the limited partnership only if he
participates in the control of the business. "However, if his
participation is not substantially the same as a general
partner's exercise of powers, the limited partner is liable
only to persons who, with actual knowledge of his participation in control and in reasonable reliance thereon, transact business with the partnership.' 27
In this decision on veil-piercing rules, there are actually two components: first, that state law applies instead of federal common
law;' 28 and, second, that the statutory limits on a limited partner's actions in controlling the partnership are the relevant standard
to guide veil piercing. 29 Both are important because, jointly, they

127. Redwing I, 875 F.Supp. at 1557 (citing and quoting ALA. CODE § 10-9A42(a)(1994)). Note that the quoted Alabama rule is substantially the same as pre-1985
RULPA §303(a). See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1495; see also infra note 159 and accompanying text.
128. Judge Hand apparently did not consider creating a federal common law to govern
the responsibilities of limited partners. See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text
(discussing the Redwing 11 court's detailed analysis of when a federal common law should
replace state law).
129. See Redwing I, 875 F.Supp. at 1557 (ruling that a limited partner is not indirectly
responsible for the limited partnership unless the limited partner takes actions of control
that cause him to lose his limited liability protection under state limited partnership law).
Under Alabama Law:
A limited partner does not participate in the control of the business within the
meaning of subsection (a) solely by doing one or more of the following: (1)
Being a contractor for or an agent, attorney-at-law, or employee of the limited
partnership or of a general partner, or an officer, director, or shareholder of a
general partner, (2) Consulting with and advising a general partner with respect
to the business of the limited partnership or examining into the state and progress of the partnership business; (3) Acting as surety or guarantor for any liabilities for the limited partnership; (4) Approving or disapproving an amendment
to the partnership agreement; or (5) Voting on one or more of the following
matters:
(i)The dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership; (ii) The
sale, exchange, lease, mortgage, pledge, or other transfer of all or substantially all of the assets of the limited partnership other than in the
ordinary course of its business; (iii) The incurrence of indebtedness by
the limited partnership other than in the ordinary course of its business;
(iv) A change in the nature of the business; or (v) The removal of a
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fit the implementation of CERCLA within existing limited partnership law. This result is noteworthy because CERCLA responsibility
is then guided by well-established limited partnership law, instead
of by newly-created standards ostensibly intended to better meet
the statute's remedial goal.
After concluding that limited partnership law governed veil
piercing, Judge Hand did not actually decide if Hutton's liability
protection was pierced because other rulings made Hutton's indirect
responsibility moot. 3 ' However, Judge Hand did consider the direct responsibility of Hutton as an operator. Here, Judge Hand
analogized to the control test applied to corporations in Jacksonville Electric, which holds stockholders of a corporation liable as
operators only when there has been "actual control. '3 After deciding the Jacksonville Electric "actual control" test was the relevant standard for the limited partners, Judge Hand suggested that
the control exercised by the limited partners was not actual control. 32 Finally, Judge Hand ruled that there was no way that
Hutton could be liable under § 9607(a)(3) as arrangers of a disposal because the 1986 repaving and 1991 pipeline work were not
disposal events, and no other disposal events were alleged during
33
Hutton's involvement at the site.
Overall, Judge Hand's application of CERCLA to limited partners is important because it shows respect for well-developed state

general partner.
ALA. CODE §10-9A-42(b) (1994).

130. See infra note 140 (discussing Judge Hand's holding that § 9607(a)(1) requires
finding a person both "owner and operatoer').
131. See Redwing I, 875 F.Supp. at 1558 (citing Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bemuth
Corp., 996 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1993)).
132. See id. The alleged acts of control were that Hutton:
(1) recommended rent increases and capital improvements at the Saraland Apartments, (2) recommended that Saraland Limited meet with Marcrum to discuss
the management of complex, (3) requested and received bids for the capital
improvements, (4) recommended assisting an interim apartment-complex manager, (5) recommended cash-flow improvements for Saraland Limited after the
1986 tax-reform act phased out passive-loss deductions, and (6) were expected
to pay Saraland Limited's legal bills.
AL
133. See i at 1559; see also infra note
for "second hand disposals," under which
because this requires voluntarily arranging a
there is no contention or sufficient evidence
defendants intended to dispose of hazardous

141 (discussing Judge Hand's voluntary test
Hutton was excused from arranger liability
disposal and "[e]ven if there were a disposal,
to persuade a reasonable jury that the Hutton
substances . . . ").
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limited partnership law and extends an existing operator standard
instead of creating a new one especially for partnerships.134 For
both reasons, Redwing I substantially decreases the uncertainty as
to how CERCLA will apply to limited partnerships. In the context
of other CERCLA decisions, where courts stretch the law to meet
the statute's remedial purpose, a ruling that respects state law and
rejects creating new federal common law is noteworthy on this
ground alone.
Turning to the general partners, Roar, Judge Hand's rulings
were similar to those for the limited partners. First, the general
partners were not deemed to be owners under § 9607(a)(1) because, under state partnership law, the general partners own only
an interest in the partnership; they do not own what the partnership
owns. "35
' Second, the status of the general partners as operators
under § 9607(a)(1) was also measured by the Jacksonville Electric
"actual control" test, and acts of control by Roar were found to be
less than those excused in Jacksonville Electric.3 6 Thus, the general partners were not owners under § 9607(a)(1) and were not
operators under § 9607(a)(2).' 37 While the rules for the general
partner in Redwing I are consistent with those developed for limited partners, the indirect responsibility of the general partners was
not considered.138 If this issue was addressed, there is little question that the general partner would be found indirectly responsible
for the limited partnership (without even resorting to a veil-piercing

134. But see infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (arguing that a better result
would be obtained by tying the limited partnership operator responsibility test to state
limited partnership law because, if other circuits also extend their corporate operator tests
to noncorporate entities, the current wide variation in corporate operator tests will just be
perpetuated).
135. See Redwing 1, 875 F.Supp. at 1566.
136. See id.
137. The analysis of the general partner's involvement is sparse in Redwing I, presumably because under Judge Hand's ruling that § 9607(a)(1) requires both "owner and opera-

tor" status, the issue of operator status is moot once owner status is rejected. See infra
note 140 (discussing Judge Hand's ruling that § 9607(a)(1) requires both owner and operator status).
138. Presumably, Judge Hand never considered the indirect responsibility of the general
partner Roar for Saraland II because this was a moot question after he ruled that Saraland

II was not equitably responsible for any of the CERCLA costs. See infra note 142 (discussing Judge Hand's ruling that Redwing was entirely responsible for the contamination,
so even though Saraland II admitted they were a responsible party under CERCLA,
Redwing was not entitled to any contribution from Saraland I).
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139
test) under a straightforward application of limited partnership law.
In summary, Judge Hand's District Court opinion presented a
well-reasoned legal analysis of how CERCLA should apply to
limited partnerships. Judge Hand also continued the development of
his controversial method of CERCLA interpretation in Redwing 1,
however, by holding that: (1) "owner and operator" means what it
says,"4 (2) inadvertent movements of soil are not disposals,'41

139. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1509 n.27 (suggesting that the general partner may be
protected from this indirect responsibility to the extent it represented a preexisting responsibility of the partnership when the new general partner entered). See also infra notes
215-34 and accompanying text (discussing how the treatment of succession issues surrounding the transfer of interests from Saraland I to Saraland II are important unresolved
issues).
140. Judge Hand's first controversial ruling in Redwing I was that the language in §
9607(a)(1), which provides that a person must be the present "owner and operator," actually means what it says: "owner and operator." See Redwing I, 875 F.Supp. at 1555-56.
Since he was attempting to overrule apparently binding precedent from the Eleventh Circuit, see United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.3 (1lth Cir. 1990)
(holding that "[a]Ithough the 'owner and operator' language of § 9607(a)(1) is in the conjunctive, we construe this language in the disjunctive in accordance with the legislative
history of CERCLA and the persuasive interpretations of other federal courts"), Judge
Hand was careful to support his controversial decision.
First, he argued that § 9607(a)(1) is clear on its face and a court should presume
that Congress intends what a statute clearly says. See Redwing I, 875 F.Supp. at 1555-56.
The clarity of the statute is shown by the disjunctive "owner or operator" language in §
9607(a)(2) because the inconsistent use in neighboring sentences suggests there is a purpose for the different word choice. See id at 1556. Second, Judge Hand argued that there
is no contradiction in the phrase interpreted conjunctively, since it is possible to be a
present owner and operator. See id. (arguing that the holding in Maryland Bank, that the
class of persons who are both owners and operators would have no members, is flawed)
(citing United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.Supp. 573, 578 (D.Md.
1986)). Third, be argued the "and" cannot be converted to "or" under the doctrine of
scrivener's error, because "the sine qua non of any 'scrivener's error' doctrine . . . is that
the meaning genuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be absolutely clear, otherwise we might be rewriting the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake," and it
is not absolutely clear that Congress did not mean the use the conjunctive. Id. (quoting
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 474 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). For all these reasons, Judge Hand rejected the traditional interpretation of §
9607(a)(1) to reach the almost heretical conclusion that the statute means what it says.
141. Judge Hand's second controversial ruling was that the phrase "disposal" in §§
9607(a)(2) and (3) contemplates a stricter standard than the broader "release" in §
9607(a)(1). Judge Hand argued there is a difference between "disposal" and "release" in
the sense that "disposal" is defined as a "discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing" and "release" is defined as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into
the environment." Redwing I, 875 F.Supp. at 1560-61 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(29),
6903(3), 9601(22)). Comparing the lists, some things that are releases-pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, escaping and leaching-are not on the list for disposals. Therefore,
Judge Hand argued, Congressional intent is clear, a release is more broadly defined than
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and (3) common law principles of divisibility of harm apply to
CERCLA contribution actions." Since all three new interpretations were overruled in Redwing II, they have not been considered
in detail here, although it should be noted that one effect of Judge
Hand's rulings may be to increase uncertainty as to how CERCLA

disposal. See id. ('Congress must have intended there be a difference between 'disposal'
and 'release,' otherwise it would not have used two different terms, much less defined
them differently."). Because of this difference in definitions, Judge Hand concluded that
the language of §§ 9607(a)(2) and (3), referring to disposals but not releases, means that
responsibility under these sections does not cover pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
escaping, and leaching. See id.
Applying this rule to what he called the "alleged second-hand disposals" of the 1986
repaving and the 1991 pipeline maintenance, Judge Hand found that these involuntary
movements of pre-contaminated soil were not disposal events. See id at 1562-63. Under
his theory, the inadvertent moving of soil for another purpose, like pipeline maintenance,
may be a release under CERCLA, but should not be considered a disposal.
The effect of this ruling was to make many of the CERCLA responsibility issues
moot because there were then no disposal events during the period that three of the defendants (Roar, Hutton, or Marcrum) were at the site. See id. (holding that Marcrum is
not an operator under § 9607(a)(2) nor an arranger under § 9607(a)(3) because there were
no disposal events); id. at 1566 (holding that no disposal events occurred during the time
Roar was a general partner). Similarly, the original developer of the site was excused
from liability because movement of the soil in building the apartments was considered an
involuntary second-hand disposal. See id. at 1564 (holding that a reasonable jury could
not find that Redwing had not already contaminated the tract of the facility on which the
apartments were built, so the movement of dirt in the construction did not move contaminate soil to a new area and there was no disposal event).
142. After arriving at the first two interpretations, Judge Hand was able to grant summary judgment on most of the claims. However, the defendant Saraland II could not be
easily relieved from liability because it had admitted responsible party status under
CERCLA. See id. at 1566-67 (noting that the court was prevented by Saraland H's admission from granting summary judgment in its favor on § 9607(a)(1) responsibility);
infra note 143.
To resolve the issue of how to equitably divide the CERCLA costs between the
only two parties left, Redwing and Saraland II, Judge Hand relied on the equitable nature
of § 9613(f) and the common law of joint tortfeasors to find that the harm caused by
Redwing was divisible and that equitable factors would deny them any contribution. See
id. at 1568-69 (analogizing to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A, which discusses
the application of joint and several liability to divisible harms, to find that Redwing's acts
of contamination were divisible from any of Saraland I, so that no contribution was due
to Redwing from Saraland I). Therefore, even though Saraland II was liable under §
9607(a)(1), Judge Hand held that since no reasonable jury could find that any contribution
should be allowed under § 9613(f), summary judgment was appropriate. See id.
Although not discussed in the present analysis, Redwing also brought an action for
unjust enrichment against the defendants, alleging that the property was made more valuable because of Redwing's actions. Id. at 1569-70. This state common law claim was
dismissed by Judge Hand because unjust enrichment is an equitable theory. (And since
Redwing was responsible for the damage, there was nothing unjust about Redwing alone
paying to clean up the site.) Id.
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will be implemented. Judge Hand's unconventional rulings may
provide new grounds to raise at trial, and perhaps may even suggest that parties should not assume that anything is ever completely
settled under CERCLA 43
C. Eleventh Circuit Opinion

A three judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Judge
Hand's rulings as they related to partnership issues, and partially
affirmed some of the other results on different grounds." As for
Judge Hand's new interpretations of CERCLA, all were overruled
except the holdings that partnership issues under CERCLA were
decided by state law, and that the Jacksonville Electric test for
operator liability applied in a partnership context1 45 The net result of Redwing II is therefore that limited partners in the Eleventh
Circuit have fairly solid protection from liability under CERCLA,
but other parties caught in CERCLA's broad scope are not protected by Judge Hand's new interpretations.
Since Redwing II represents the first time a federal appellate
court considered CERCLA as applied to limited partnerships, the
partnership rulings are the most important part of the decision."
The first key ruling is that the partnership interests owned by both
limited and general partners are considered personal property. 47
As the Redwing I court ruled, the partners do not own what the

143. For example, if the partners of Saraland H knew that Judge Hand would be creating new CERCLA interpretations that had the effect of excusing most of the defendants,
they undoubtedly would not have admitted to § 9607(a) responsibility, since they believed
they were owners but not operators. See id. at 1568 n.85 (surmising that Saraland 11
admitted to responsibility because they accepted the Fleet Factors determination that
"owner and operator" is interpreted as "owner or operator"). Or at the least Saraland H
would have asserted the § 9607(b) third party defense. See id. at 1567 (suggesting, in
dicta, that the third party defense would be easy to satisfy).
144. See generally Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1489.
145. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Redwing II ruling
that the Redwing I court was bound by an Eleventh Circuit ruling that "owner and operator" is interpreted as "owner or operator"); infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text
(discussing the Redwing 11 replacement of Judge Hand's "voluntary second-hand disposal"
analysis with their own new interpretation); infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text
(discussing the Redwing II ruling that common law principles of divisibility of harm do
not apply to a contribution action under § 9613(f)).
146. See Redwing 1I, 94 F.3d at 1499 n.12 ('The parties have cited, and our research
has uncovered, only one reported decision from a federal court addressing a limited
partner's liability under CERCLA.") (citing, as the only case, Soo Line R. Co. v. BJ.

Carney & Co., 797 F.Supp. 1472 (D.Minn. 1992)).
147. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1498.
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partnership owns, so neither limited nor general partners are considered owners for the purposes of § 9607(a)(1) or §
9607(a)(2).'4 This ruling is consistent with certain well-established partnership tenets that treat the partnership as an entity separate from its partners. Nonetheless, it is an important ruling because it is not obvious from the history of CERCLA implementation that a court would respect limited partnership law.' 49 In
fact, on this point Redwing H is directly contrary to the only federal court case considering the issue, which did not separate the
150
liability of the partnership from the general or limited partners.
In rejecting the Soo Line ruling, the Eleventh Circuit held that
"nothing in CERCLA suggests we should disregard traditional
concepts of limited liability in the corporate or partnership contexts
in assessing owner liability under the Act."''
Once a court decides that none of the partners are owners, the
next question is whether either the limited partners or general
partners can be held indirectly responsible through corporate veil
piercing. With respect to general partners, the Redwing H court
never reached the issue of whether a veil-piercing test is required
because they are already indirectly liable for the obligations of the
52
limited partnership as a matter of limited partnership law.

148. See id.
149. See Flesher & Bryk, supra note 59, at 4 (concluding that present standards are too
inconsistent to provide clear guidance for parent companies that want to avoid responsibility for their subsidiaries' environmental liability). The argument here is that the limited
partners own ninety-nine percent of Saraland II and receive the beneficial interest from
use of the facility, so, under the remedial purpose canon of CERCLA, it is not obvious
ex ante that the limited partners will be shielded from Saraland H's CERCLA responsibility.
150. See Soo Line, 797 F.Supp. at 1485-86 (holding that since both individuals and
partnerships are listed as "persons" under CERCLA, and since all "persons" are jointly
and severally liable, the distinction between individual partners and the partnership will
not matter unless the harm of the parties can be shown to be divisible).
151. Redwing II, 59 F.3d at 1499-1500 n.12. The Redwing If court distinguished Soo
Line by stating:
[To the extent the Soo Line court rested this particular holding on
that CERCLA imposes liability directly on a limited partner merely
partnership itself is liable, then we must respectfully disagree with
sion. Such reasoning ignores the limited liability nature of these
under state law.

the premise
because the
this conclupartnerships

Id.
152. See id. at 1508-09 (declining to reach a decision on this point since other rulings
made the point moot and since the record was not well-developed enough to decide if the
general partners of Saraland H assumed the preexisting CERCLA responsibility when they
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However, the Redwing II court also suggested that there could be
an exception to this rule because, as a matter of partnership law,
incoming general partners are insulated from existing partnership
responsibilities.'53 While the issue is not decided because there
are not enough facts, Redwing II suggests a workable rule: general
partners are indirectly responsible for the partnership's CERCLA
responsibility without a veil-piercing analysis unless those general
partners have explicitly not assumed this responsibility, in which
case a veil-piercing analysis will be required to measure indirect
responsibility."'
Turning to the question of the limited partner's liability shield,
the Redwing 11 court found there was a "dearth of authority" on
how CERCLA interacted with state partnership law; therefore, it
was not immediately clear if state partnership law or federal common law should govern the question of when to pierce the limited
partner's limited liability.155 To resolve this question, the court
turned to the applicable rule from the Supreme Court decision in
Kimbell Foods: "'[W]hether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial policy dependent upon
a variety of considerations always relevant to the nature of specific
governmental interests and to the effects upon them of applying

purchased their interest in 1984).
153. See id.; see also UNIF. PARTNERSI Acr § 17 (1914) ("A person admitted as a
partner into an existing partnership is liable for all the obligations of the partnership arising before his admission as though he had been a partner when such obligations were
incurred, except that this liability shall be satisfied only out of partnership property.");
REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNrSHP ACT § 403(b) (1976) ("Except as provided in this Act,
a general partner of a limited partnership has the liabilities of a partner in a partnership
without limited partners to persons other than the partnership and the other partners.");
infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (analyzing the implications of the Redwing II
court's suggestion that incoming general partners could be insulated from CERCLA responsibility and discussing how the third party defense extended to Roar depends heavily
on how the succession between the partners in Saraland I and the partners in Saraland II
is treated).
154. There is an unresolved issue as to what veil-piercing test should apply to a general
partner who has limited liability with respect to a preexisting obligation. See notes 245-48
and accompanying text (discussing the implications of Redwing II for LLCs, and noting
an important unresolved issue for LLCs--deciding what test should apply to pierce the
LLC veil to apply indirect responsibility to its members).
155. Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1498-1500 (reviewing de novo whether to apply state law
or federal common law regarding limited partnerships under CERCLA).
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state law.""' 15 6 Under Kimbell Foods, courts must consider three
factors:
1. whether there is a need for a nationally uniform body of
law to apply in situations like the one before the court; 2.
whether application of the state law rule would frustrate
important federal policy; and 3. the impact a federal com-

mon law 57
rule might have on existing relationships under
state law.
Applying Kimbell Foods to the question of limited partnership
law, the Redwing II court found that the first factor points in favor
of state law since "[t]here is significant agreement among the 50
states and the District of Columbia on the broad outlines of a rule
governing the liability of limited partners ... because nearly every
jurisdiction in this country has adopted a version of the Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1976 (RULPA)."'58 In essence, they found that, since RULPA already functions as a national standard, there is no need to create a federal common law.'59
As for the second factor, the Redwing II court found that state
laws were not inconsistent with the goals of CERCLA.'" In support of this ruling, the court analogized to a Sixth Circuit decision
holding that state law on corporate dissolutions and mergers should

156. See id. at 1500 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 72628 (1979) (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947))).
157. See id. at 1501 (quoting Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29).
158. See id. at 1501 n.14.
159. There are actually two different standards for limited partner liability under state
implementations of RULPA. As amended in 1985, § 303 of RULPA holds that a limited
partner who has "participated in the control of the business" is liable to:
[P]ersons who transact business with the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a
general partner.
REVISED UNiF. LTD. PAmRNtERsI-m AcT § 303 (1985). In the 1976 implementation of
RULPA, a limited partner is liable ifin addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he
takes part in the control of the business. However, if the limited partner's
participation in the control of the business is not substantially the same as the
exercise of the powers of a general partner, he is liable only to persons who
transact business with the limited partnership with actual knowledge of his
participation in control.
See REVIsED UNto. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACt § 303(a) (1976). As noted above, Alabama's
Code reflects the 1976 version. See supra notes 111, 125, 127.
160. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1500.
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be the federal decision rule under CERCLA.16 1 Under the rationale of the Sixth Circuit's decision, state law based on the state's
substantial, independent interest in protecting its citizens and resources is presumed to be complementary to the United States
interest in implementing CERCLA 62 The Redwing II court
adopted a similar approach, holding that state limited partnership
law, with its substantial uniformity and potential for applying liability to limited partners who take too many control actions, is
adequate to meet CERCLA's goal of making the polluter pay.' 6
On the last factor of the Kimbell Foods test, the Redwing II
court decided that a federal common law would negatively impact
existing state limited partnership laws."6 The problem with creating a federal common law, the court argued, is that it is the very
concept of limited liability that attracts investors to limited partnerships, and these investors' expectations are upset if a federal common law applies instead of the defining state statute.165 Thus, the
court ruled that, under all the factors of the Kimbell Foods test,
state limited partnership law should govern the question of how
CERCLA should apply to limited partners in a limited partnership.' 66
Once the Redwing II court determined that state limited partnership law applied to the question of whether to pierce the limited
partner's liability protection, it compared the actions of Hutton to
the list of accepted actions for limited partners provided in the
Alabama Code. 67 Since Hutton only possessed rights to control
important decisions, but never actually exercised any of these
rights, the court found that it did not lose its limited partner status

161. See id. at 1501 (referring favorably to the rationale of Anspec v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991)).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 1501-02.
164. See id. at 1502.
165. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1502 ("Given the popularity of the limited partnership
structure as a means of organizing businesses and attracting investment in this country, we
hesitate to upset the expectations investors have under current state law rules by adopting
a federal common law rule."). This ruling, that courts should hesitate to upset the expectations of investors, highlights the clash between the remedial paradigm of CERCLA and
a newer paradigm, legitimate expectations of investors. See Oakes, supra note 25, at
10,308-10,311 (discussing the interaction of CERCLA with the emerging "expectations of

investors" paradigm).
166. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1502.
167. See supra note 129 (presenting the relevant Alabama Code sections).
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under Alabama limited partnership law. Therefore Hutton could not
168
be held indirectly responsible for Saraland U's responsibility.
After considering the indirect responsibility of Roar and
Hutton, the next issue to be addressed is the all-important question
of direct responsibility as an operator. In a precursor to its analysis
of operator status, however, the Redwing II court first addressed
Judge Hand's ruling that § 9607(a)(1) liability requires owner and
operator liability because, under Judge Hand's standard, the question of operator liability under § 9607(a)(1) is moot if the person
is not an owner. 169 The Redwing II court dealt with this controversial ruling by simply noting that the district court is bound by
the Eleventh Circuit opinion in Fleet Factors that "owner and
operator" should be interpreted as "owner or operator."' 70 Thus,
regardless of Judge Hand's argument that the Fleet Factors interpretation is not supported by the statutory text and is due for reconsideration, the Redwing II court declined such reconsideration;
holding that it is settled law within the Eleventh Circuit that "a
person is a responsible party under subsection 107(a)(1) if they are
the current owner or operator of a facility.''
Once established that a person could be an owner or operator
under § 9607(a)(1), the court must frame the test for operator
liability under CERCLA for limited partners in a limited partnership. To decide this issue, the Redwing II court followed the analysis of Redwing I and analogized to the application of operator
liability in the corporate context. The court decided that the "actual
control" test of Jacksonville Electric applied to limited liability
partnerships as well as corporations. 2 Under this test, the fact
that the percentage interest in the partnership is large or that a
partner has authority to control is not sufficient to trigger operator

168. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1503. ("Merely having the authority to control certain
aspects of a partnership's business without actually using that authority does not amount
to 'tak[ing] part in the control of the [partnership's] business."') (quoting ALA. CODE §
10-9A-42(a) (1994)).
169. See supra note 140 (discussing Judge Hand's interpretation of § 9607(a)(1)).
170. Redwing 1I,94 F.3d at 1497-98. Therefore, "[t]he district court was not free to
disregard Fleet Factor's reasoning, and neither are we. Absent a supervening Supreme
Court decision or a change in statutory law, we are bound by a prior panel's decision."
ld.at 1498. This statement appears technically incorrect because presumably the Eleventh
Circuit, acting en banc, would have the authority to overrule a prior panel's decision.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 1503-04.
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liability."' Instead, it must be demonstrated that the partner either "(1) actually participated in operating the Site or the
activities resulting in the disposal of hazardous substances, or (2)
'actually exercised control over, or [was] otherwise intimately in'
volved in the operations of the Partnership."174
By restricting operator liability to those who themselves participated in the wrongful
conduct prohibited, the actual control test is designed to meet the
policy of CERCLA that operator liability be based only on a person's actions.175
Since the tests for holding a corporate stockholder or officer
responsible as an operator under §§ 9607(a)(1) or (2) differ greatly
across the circuits, the rationale of the Redwing II court in deciding
which standard to apply is worth exploring further.17 6 Before
agreeing with Judge Hand and applying the corporate operator
standard, the Redwing 1I court considered the alternative theories
that are applied in other circuits; the first being the theory that
operator liability should be imposed only when the corporate veil
is pierced.'" While the Redwing II court implicitly rejected a
rule where operator liability would be governed by the same standards as veil piercing, they gave no rationale for this ruling, so it
is not clear why the court rejected this approach. 7 ' Next, the
Redwing 1I court considered the "authority to control" test, which
looks at whether the alleged operator had the authority to control
hazardous waste decisions. 7 9 This test was rejected since it "is
simply incompatible with [the] reasoning in Jacksonville Elec.'' s
Finally, the court considered the Eighth Circuit's test, perhaps best
described as the "actual control of hazardous waste" test, which

173. See id. at 1505.
174. Redwing If, 94 F.3d at 1505 (quoting Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp.,
996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1993)).
175. See id. at 1504.
176. See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text (discussing the wide variation in

tests to determine operator status in the corporate context).
177. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1504 n.17; see also supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit rule that operator status applies only when the
corporate veil can be pierced).
178. See Redwing 1I, 94 F.3d at 1504.
179. See id. at 1504 (considering the "authority to control" test approved by the Fourth
Circuit in Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992)
and by the Ninth Circuit in Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp.,
976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992)). See also supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (discussing the "authority to control" test under its alternative name, "ability to control").
180. Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1505.
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considers all parties who have authority over the disposal of hazardous wastes, and who actually exercise that authority, to be operators.' Since this test would in practice find fewer persons responsible as operators than Jacksonville Electric, it was rejected
because "the disposal of hazardous substances is a sufficient, but
not a necessary, condition to the imposition of operator liability.""' Since none of the tests other than the "actual control" test
were therefore acceptable, the Redwing II court concluded that the
Jacksonville Electric operator test should apply to limited partners
in a limited partnership." 3
Under the Jacksonville Electric "actual control" test, an operator under §§ 9607(a)(1) or (2) need not have actually controlled
the disposal of hazardous substances, but must have participated in
substantial control of the partnership.8 4 In choosing the operator
responsibility rule that would apply to limited partnerships, the
Redwing II court apparently did not consider the issue de novo, as
they did with choosing the veil-piercing test for limited partners.
This is unfortunate, since the rule of Redwing II can be fairly
stated as requiring that the operator responsibility test from the
corporate context be applied to all alleged operators. There are two
problems with this type of rule. First, it ignores the possibility that
state entity law could provide a more predictable "control" test.
Second, implementation of this rule in other jurisdictions will
spread the existing variation in operator responsibility from the
corporate context to all other entities. On the other hand, if the
Redwing II court had considered the possibility of using the detailed control test already existing in limited partnership law, a
better general rule would have been established. 5 In the court's

181. See id. at 1505 n.19. See also supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing
the Eighth Circuit's unique operator rule).
182. Redwing 1I, 94 F.3d at 1505 n.19.
183. See id at 1505.
184. The Jacksonville Electric "actual control" test essentially follows the majority rule
for operator responsibility tests. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (discussing
the actual control test adopted in the majority of jurisdictions).
185. The alternative rule proposed here is that RULPA, as implemented by state limited
partnership law, with its limits on the acts of control that the limited partners can take
before losing their limited liability, could also be applied to the operator responsibility test
that looks at similar types of control activities. Compare supra notes 125, 129 (discussing
the acts of control for which limited partners can lose their limited liability) with supra
notes 89-93 and accompanying text (discussing the implementation of the "actual control"

operator test).
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favor, however, the Jacksonville Electric standard probably is less
likely to find a limited partner to be an operator than the application of the control test in limited partnership law.186 So it is only
in considering how Redwing II will be applied in other circuits that
the court's failure to consider, de novo, all the options for applying
the operator test will become important. Once the standard for
partners in a partnership was decided to be the Jacksonville Electric standard, application to Hutton was simple because the
Redwing II court also found that the limited partners exercised less
actual control than the corporate stockholder in Jacksonville Electric, who was not considered to be an operator."8 7
As for the other defendants, the Redwing II court impliedly
ruled that the Jacksonville Electric operator test applied to all the
classes of defendants when it applied the same test in all of its
considerations of direct operator responsibility under CERCLA.
Thus, the Redwing H1 court considered the present operator responsibility of the management agent, Marcrum, using the Jacksonville
Electric actual control test.18 As applied to the facts, the court
then found enough acts of control by the management agent to

raise a material question of fact such that summary judgment was
inappropriate.' 89 The significance of finding that Marcrum is po-

186. Both courts easily determined that the Jacksonville Electric control test was not
met as applied to the limited partners, so there really was no serious issue of how to
measure the acts of Saraland II. See Redwing I, 875 F.Supp. at 1559 ("[No reasonable
jury could conclude that the alleged "control" has exceeded the control which the alleged
operator exercised in Jacksonville Electric ....
"); Redwing 1i, 94 F.3d at 1505 ("[T]he
record lacks any significantly probative evidence that the Hutton partners controlled the
Saraland Site itself or had any connection with the alleged disposals occurring after they
bought their interest in 1984."). In fact, it seems likely that a limited partner would usually trigger the RULPA control test before the Jacksonville Electric operator test.
187. See Redwing 1I, 94 F.3d at 1505; see also supra notes 132, 186 (discussing the
District Court's findings on this issue).
188. See id. at 1510.
189. See id. at 1509-10. The record included the following acts by Marcrum in its role
as managing agent
1. prepared annual budgets for the complex and required the resident manager
to regularly report expenses to Marcrum and seek approval from Marcrum of
any expenses exceeding the budget;
2. regularly inspected the complex, and required the resident manager to perform quarterly inspections and report on these inspections to Marcrum;
3. ordered the resident manager to implement major improvement and repair
programs for the complex as a whole;
4. ordered the resident manager to make specific repairs to particular units by
certain deadlines;
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tentially responsible as a present operator is that management com-

panies running apartment complexes may now face CERCLA responsibility. Although the Redwing II court does not comment

much on this result, this possibility could significantly increase the
exposure of management agents to CERCLA, particularly in jurisdictions where the broad "authority to control" operator test applies.' Thus, the Redwing H ruling that the management agent's
acts of control were to be independently analyzed under the operator control test could represent a notable expansion of CERCLA
responsibility. While the actual impact of this ruling is presently
unclear, management agents of apartment buildings should be concerned about the implications.1 9'
Next, the Redwing II court considered the question of whether
the general partners, Roar, could be held responsible as present
operators. The court did not reach the point of deciding the appropriate standard (presumably Jacksonville Electric would have been
chosen) because it ruled that, regardless of § 9607(a)(1) responsibility, the general partners satisfied the third party defense of §
9607(b)(3).19 2 In this third party defense ruling, the court found
that there was no contractual relationship between the current general partners, Roar, and the only PRPs, Redwing and Meador.' 93
Further, since Roar exercised due care toward the existing contamination and took precautions against foreseeable acts of contamina-

5. received complaints from tenants, and forwarded these complaints to the
resident manager with instructions as to how and by when to respond to the
complaints; and
6. prepared proposed rent increases for approval by the Partnership and HUD.
Id. "In addition, the record suggests Marcnm has, in the past, been partly responsible for
remedying tar seeps as they appeared on the property." Id. at 1510.
190. To the extent other courts follow Redwing 11 and apply its corporate operator responsibility test to management agents, the application of the broad "authority to control"
test is likely to ensnare many management agents. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (discussing the broadly defined test known as "ability to control" or "authority to
control").
191. Since the court detailed exactly how a management agent could be judged responsible as a present operator under CERCLA, there is now a well-developed theory that
could be easily argued in other cases.
192. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1506, n.25, see also supra note 137.
193. See id. at 1508. But see infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (suggesting that
the Redwing II court improperly ignored the clear contractual connection between Roar
and the partners in Saraland I, who presumably were responsible for Saraland I's
CERCLA responsibility).
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tion, the third party defense was satisfied.194 Thus, the general
partners were excused from liability as present operators because
they asserted a successful third party defense.
While this decision on the third party defense appears unremarkable as described in Redwing II, it is actually quite remarkable. First, the third party defense is rarely successful because of
the flexibility of courts to find indirect contractual relationships or
lack of due care with respect to existing contamination.195 Here,
however, the court's decision was apparently predicated only on an
examination of the parties before the court.'9 6 An analysis of
Roar's contractual links with persons, such as the original partners
who sold their interests to Roar (who could easily be themselves
responsible for CERCLA responsibility), is completely missing.19 7
Therefore, by narrowing the list of persons who could supply the
necessary contractual link to defendants in the litigation, the
Redwing I court is increasing the chances that a person will be
able to establish the third party defense.' 98
After considering the present operator status, the Redwing II
court examined the § 9607(a)(2) responsibility covering owners or
operators during past disposals and the § 9607(a)(3) responsibility
for arrangers of past waste disposals.' 99 The Redwing II court
194. See Redwing 11, 94 F.3d at 1508.
195. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in establishing the third party defense).
196. See Redwing 11, 94 F.3d at 1508 (where the court mentions only the defendants
Redwing and Meador when searching for a contractual link between Roar and a CERCLA
responsible person).
197. See infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text (describing how the original partners
in Saraland I were presumably responsible parties since Meador was a PRP for arranging
disposals at the time when Saraland I owned the site; see also infra notes 233-34 and
accompanying text (discussing how the issues of succession in partnerships provide ample
precedent for the Redwing II court to have denied the third party defense because of an
indirect contractual relationship)).
198. The clear implication of this ruling is that the availability of the third party defense depends on the subset of PRPs who remain as viable parties at the time of litigation, since these are the only parties examined for a contractual link. While this is probably not what the Redwing 1Hcourt intended, the alternative of extending the search for
contractual links to missing parties is not particularly satisfying either, because that would
require a determination of the CERCLA responsibility of defunct parties.
199. Since both categories depend on the definition of disposal, the Redwing If court
had to deal with Judge Hand's ruling that an involuntary second-hand disposal was not a
disposal under §§ 9607(a)(2) or (3). See supra note 141 (discussing Judge Hand's new
interpretation of disposal under § 9607(a)(2) and (a)(3)). While the Redwing 11 court
agreed with Judge Hand that neither the 1986 repaving nor the 1991 pipeline maintenance
was a "disposal" under CERCLA, the Redwing 11 court rejected Judge Hand's new rule in
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ruled that while "CERCLA's definition of 'disposal' should be read
broadly to include the subsequent movement and dispersal of hazardous substances within a facility," it must be affirmatively proven
that the movement of previously contaminated soil was permanent.2" Therefore, even though the 1986 and 1991 events might
be disposals, there is no evidence in the record that either event resulted in the permanent movement of contaminated soil. Consequently, "the only reasonable inference is that any soil dug up
during the process was returned from whence it came [and] ...
[n]o matter how broadly the term is defined, this conduct did not
amount to disposal."' Therefore, even in the process of rejecting
Judge Hand's new rule, the Eleventh Circuit created an apparently
new rule that limits the scope of finding disposal events in every
movement of previously contaminated soil to those events that can
be proven to be permanent.
Once established that no disposal events occurred during their
tenure at the site, Marcrum could not be found to be an owner or
operator during the time of a disposal under § 9607(a)(2), or an
arranger of a disposal under § 9607(a)(3). 2' Similar arguments
would presumably apply to the defendants Roar and Hutton, if the
Redwing II court had not decided these issues on other
grounds. 2 3 As for Meador, the developer of the apartments, the
Redwing II court ruled that no past operator responsibility could be
found because this claim was not pleaded or argued in the district
court.' 4 This left no viable claims for operator responsibility under § 9607(a)(2), and the only viable arranger claim left under §
9607(a)(3) was against Meador for hiring subcontractors to develop
the site back in 1980.205 The fact that contaminated material was
found on the site in a place where Redwing Carriers never operated served as proof that previously contaminated soil was moved

favor of their own new rule. See Redwing 11, 94 F.3d at 1510.
200. Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1510 (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus
Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1992)).
201. Id. at 1510-11.
202. See id.

203. See id. at 1506 (holding that Hutton was not involved enough in the control of the
partnership to be considered an arranger); id. at 1508-09 (discussing the liability of the
general partners, Roar, but not considering past operator liability presumably because the
general partners already could be indirectly responsible).
204. See Redwing 11, 94 F.3d at 1511 n.30.
205. See id. at 1512.
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during the initial development of the apartment buildings.6
Since there was credible evidence that a permanent movement of
soil had taken place, summary judgment was not appropriate on the
claim that Meador arranged for the disposal of hazardous materials
during the construction of the building.' 7
The final issue considered by the Redwing I1court was divisibility of the harm."5 After stating that they were not ruling on
Judge Hand's equitable determination that Redwing was entirely
responsible, the Eleventh Circuit panel rejected Judge Hand's intertwining of the divisibility of harm defense with a contribution
action under § 9613(f). The panel held instead that the divisibility
defense does not apply to § 9613(f) actions.' Judge Hand's decision to excuse Saraland from a factual determination of its responsibility was therefore incorrect.21 ° However, it should be noted that even though Judge Hand's divisibility analysis was overruled, it is not obvious that RedWing will be awarded anything
upon remand. This is because a § 9613(f) contribution action is

206. See id. Since Meador was potentially responsible as an arranger, they would also
have been potentially responsible under the Jacksonville Electric control test, if this claim
had been pleaded.
207. See id. at 1511-12. The ruling against Meador is based on the Eleventh Circuit's
concurrence with the rule of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that "a 'disposal' may occur
when a party disperses contaminated soil during the course of grading and filling a construction site." Id. at 1512 (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev.
Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1992); Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. CharlesThomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 1988)). Further, the Redwing II rule that, to
be held liable for arranger liability, "a CERCLA plaintiff... need not demonstrate a
party acted with the specific intent to dispose of hazardous substances or made certain
'crucial decisions' regarding the disposal of those substances in order to establish a defendant has 'arranged for' a disposal" Redwing 11, 94 F.3d at 1512, was also important to
this determination.
Once Meador is considered a PRP as an arranger, the immediate implication is that
the contractor who actually did the work could also be considered a PRP as an operator.
There is therefore at least one more PRP at the site who was not part of the Redwing
litigation.
208. Judge Hand had ruled that Redwing's responsibility for the harm was divisible
from the other defendants, so that no contribution was due regardless of whether the
defendants were responsible parties under CERCLA. See supra note 142 (discussing Judge
Hand's application of the common law of divisibility of harm to a CERCLA contribution

action).
209. See Redwing 11, 94 F.3d at 1513 (arguing that since there is no joint and several
liability among defendants in a contribution action, the common law notion of divisibility
has no relevance to a § 9613(f) contribution action).
210. See iULat 1514.

1202

CASE WESTERAN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 47.1157

guided by equitable principles and Judge Hand appears convinced
that Redwing should bear the full responsibility.2 1'
Overall, the Redwing 11 opinion is notable for several reasons.
First, the panel affirmed the district court on the determination that
state limited partnership law governed the application of CERCLA
to both limited and general partners for ownership responsibility
and for indirect responsibility. These decisions are important since
the choice of well-developed state law decreases the uncertainty
about how CERCLA will apply. 2 Further, it gives limited partners a clear answer as to how they can avoid CERCLA responsibility: do not exercise control over the limited partnership beyond
what is allowable under state law. However, in their second notable
ruling, that the Jacksonville Electric standard applied to the determination of direct operator responsibility for all parties, the
Redwing II court may have undone their strong defense of the
limited partnership form by introducing a text grounded in the
corporate context to the acts of limited partners. While it would
have been preferable if the Redwing II court had considered using
the limits in state partnership law as a control test, the choice of
the actual control standard is not likely to cause too much mischief, since it tends to be stricter in application than the limited
partner control limits. In other circuits with more relaxed operator
tests, however, the Redwing II rule that the corporate operator
standard applies may actually lead to an undermining of the strong
protection given by the indirect responsibility test.
Redwing II is also noteworthy for creating several novel rules.
First, the panel found that an apartment management company
could be held as a current operator for their extensive acts in controlling property that was contaminated. This is likely to be a real
"eye-opener" in some circles. Next, the Redwing I1 court applied a
sensible limit to the Tanglewood rule that moving contaminated
soil was a new disposal event. By requiring proof of a permanent

211. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's ruling that divisibility of harm has no place in an
equitable § 9613(f) action is more a theoretical ruling than one of practical significance.
See id. at 1513 (holding that the ability of the court, with the assistance of the parties, to
distinguish among separate harms caused by different parties is an appropriate factor for a

court to consider in making a fair division of liability).
212. While established federal law generally provides uniformity, the predictability regarding the extent of investor liability offered by state partnership law is critical in this
context. See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Redwing II court's
decision to follow state law).
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movement of soil, ordinary events like pipeline maintenance (digging a hole, then refilling it with the same soil) cannot even be
alleged to be disposal events unless there is some proof that the
contamination was spread. Finally, the Redwing II court applied a
nontraditional interpretation of the third party defense by limiting
the search for a direct or indirect contractual link to the defendants
actually before the court. While it is not clear if the court intended
this result, or was merely confused as to the succession between
Saraland I and Saraland II, the court's application of the third
party defense only to the parties present in the litigation could be a
significant new limitation if followed elsewhere.

M.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REDWING DECISIONS

There are two implications of Redwing II worthy of further
consideration. The first is one of the puzzling subtexts to the cases;
how the partnership succession between Saraland I and Saraland II
should be treated." This issue underlies both the analysis of
whether the current general partner is indirectly responsible for
Saraland II or is insulated from this responsibility because he is an
incoming partner, and the analysis of whether the current general
partner had a contractual relationship with a responsible party. The
second implication worth exploring is what Redwing I and Redwing
II will mean for the other major noncorporate entity offering limited liability, the LLC. Given the paucity of case law interpreting
this relatively new entity, the cases discussed here are likely to be
influential in deciding how CERCLA responsibility will affect an
LLC and its members.2 14
A. PartnershipSuccession and CERCLA
Because they were presented with one of the first opportunities
to apply CERCLA to limited partnerships, the Redwing I and
Redwing II courts can be fairly criticized for not expressly considering the buried issue of how to treat the conversion between the
original Saraland partnership and the limited partnership created in
1984.2"' Several key decisions turned on the fact that the partners
213. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing the technical dissolution
of Saraland I that occurred when the partners sold their interests to Hutton and Roar, and
the formation of a new partnership, Saraland IT,organized as a limited partnership).
214. See infra note 246 and accompanying text (describing the lack of judicial decisions
as to what veil-piercing test should apply to LLCs).
215. Both the Redwing I and Redwing II courts measured the involvement of Roar and
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in Saraland II, both general and limited, were only on the site after
1984. However, this ignores the salient fact that the predecessor
partnership, Saraland I, and its partners probably incurred CERCLA
responsibility before 1984.216 Thus, there is a real issue concerning whether and how the responsibility of Saraland I and its partners transferred to Saraland II and its partners.
This buried issue arises in Redwing II when the court briefly
mentions that the general partners in Saraland II may not be responsible for the CERCLA responsibility of Saraland II. This is so
because they are incoming partners who are insulated from liability
for any preexisting partnership responsibility as a matter of partnership law.2" 7 Although it is true that incoming general partners are
insulated from preexisting liabilities, there are two problems with
the Redwing II suggestion. First, the sale of interests by the partners in Saraland I to Hutton and Roar to create Saraland II does
not appear to be a succession in partnerships since, under partnership law, there is technically a dissolution of Saraland I and creation of a new partnership.2 18 This means there is no continuing
partnership, so that the rule insulating the incoming general partner
from preexisting responsibilities should not apply.21 9 The second
problem is that, even if Roar is insulated from any preexisting
CERCLA responsibility of Saraland II, Roar bought its partnership
interests from persons who could have been responsible persons

Hutton at the site only subsequent to their purchase in 1984. See supra notes 141, 202-03
and accompanying text. As for considering the Saraland II partnership as a successor to
the Saraland I partnership, the Redwing II court argued that "[a]Ithough the current
Saraland Limited [I] partnership could perhaps be considered a 'successor' to the partnership formed in 1973 given an amended partnership agreement was executed in 1984, the
current partners themselves are not 'successors' to any partnership. Rather, they own an
interest in the potential 'successor' partnership." Redwing 11, 94 F.3d at 1503 n.16.
216. The potential of CERCLA responsibility for Saraland I and its partners can be
inferred from the Redwing II analysis of the developer Meador. See generally supra notes
206-07 and accompanying text. Since Meador was found potentially responsible as an
arranger for moving contaminated dirt around the site when the apartments were built,
Saraland I, who owned the site at that time, would also be presumably responsible. See
id. Once Saraland I is responsible, all the partners are then indirectly responsible. See
supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Redwing 11 suggestion that
partners who are liable for the partnership's debts and obligations are automatically considered indirectly responsible for the partnership's CERCLA responsibility).
217. See Redwing II, 94 F.3d at 1508 n.27.
218. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing how the succession between Saraland I and Saraland I is characterized under partnership law principles).
219. See id; see also supra note 153 (reciting the UPA rule for incoming partner liability that implicitly assumes there is a continuing partnership).
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themselves. Thus a lingering question is whether CERCLA responsibility attaches to the partnership interest itself." This question
of how to treat the succession of a partnership interests (along with
the broader question of how to treat the succession of partnerships
themselves) is an important but unresolved issue in Redwing I and
Redwing I.
In addition to the issue of an incoming partner's insulation
from responsibility, there are unresolved succession questions concerning the third party defense; namely, the possibility in Redwing
I that the court would have favorably considered the third party
defense for Saraland II, and the Redwing II court's determination
that Roar satisfies the third party defense." Again, the Redwing
I and Redwing II courts fail to consider the subtleties of how partnership succession underlies their analyses. Taking the Redwing I
court ruling first, it is not clear from the brief excerpt in the case
("For purposes of summary judgment, [Saraland H1] declines to
assert the defenses of §9607(b)") that the court would have favorably considered this defense.' For discussion purposes, however,
to hold that Saraland II satisfied the third party defense it must be
shown that either Saraland I was not a responsible party or that
there was no contractual link (either direct or indirect) between
Saraland I and Saraland II.' Since Saraland I was presumably a
responsible party under CERCLA, characterization of the transition
between Saraland I and Saraland II is required. 4
The general rule of succession applicable in the corporate context is that a successor corporation (the surviving corporation after
a merger) retains the CERCLA responsibility of the subsumed
corporation.
But under partnership law, one partnership termi-

220. Since partnership law holds that the partnership interest is personal property of the
partner and represents only his share of profits and surplus, the general rule is that liabilities do not transfer with partnership interests. See UNiF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 26 (1914);
REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNsHIP AcT § 101(10) (1976). However, to give effect to the
remedial purpose of CERCLA, it is possible, although unlikely, that CERCLA responsibility could attach to a partnership interest (given that the incoming partners can still be
reached under other theories of liability).
221. See supra notes 138, 193 and accompanying text.
222. Redwing I, 875 F.Supp. at 1567.
223. See supra notes 48-52 (discussing the third party defense of § 9607(b)).
224. See supra note 207 (discussing how the analysis of Meador's responsibility strongly
suggests that Saraland I could also be potentially responsible).
225. See Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1246 (6th Cir. 1991).
As the court noted:
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nates and another begins when all the original partners sell their
interests to new partners forming a limited partnership.' Therefore the corporate rule cannot directly apply to partnerships.
But this raises another question. Does the CERCLA responsibility of the dissolving partnership survive if the newly formed partnership begins operations by essentially replacing the old partnership?227 Since CERCLA responsibility is not easy to discharge,
and since the remedial purpose is not met by allowing a responsible party to escape responsibility by dissolving, the dissolving
partnership's responsibility must be borne by someone2m One
answer is that the partners in the terminating partnership retain the
responsibility. 9 The rationale for this answer is that the selling
partners were indirectly responsible for Saraland's CERCLA responsibility before the sale, and received valuable consideration for
their partnership interests. Thus, it is equitable that they retain this
responsibility."3 An alternative answer is that the new partnership
is constructively considered as a successor if they purchase the
assets and continue the operations of the terminating partnership.2 1 While this requires ignoring the technical distinctions in

In general, when two corporations merge pursuant to statutory provisions, liabilities become the responsibility of the surviving company. "In the case of merger of one corporation into another, where one of the corporations ceases to
exist and the other corporation continues in existence, the latter corporation is
liable for the debts, contracts and torts of the former, at least to the extent of
the property and assets received, and this liability is often expressly imposed by
statute."
Id. (quoting 15 W.
'RCHER,CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
7121, at 185 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)).
226. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing how Saraland II apparently took over for Saraland I in every way, with the exception that Saraland H was
organized as a limited partnership).
228. See Dolan, supra note 8, at 182-83 (describing how parties can arrange for indemnification from CERCLA responsibility but cannot discharge it by contract).
229. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (arguing that the original partners in
Saraland I are indirectly responsible for Saraland's CERCLA responsibility).
230. Actually, the economically rational result here would depend on whether the price
paid for the partnership interests included an assessment of the CERCLA responsibility. If
this were the case, then, equitably, the original partners should not pay again. But in the
present case, neither selling partner nor buying partner appeared to know of the impending CERCLA problem, so the price probably did not reflect CERCLA costs.
231. The argument here is that when one partnership takes over for another, the dissolution is only an artifact of partnership law; the reality is that this is a succession. Thus,
the rules of corporate succession, that the surviving entity be charged with the debts of
the former entity, could constructively be applied. See Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1246 ("[We
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partnership law that make adopting a succession theory difficult,
under the remedial purpose of CERCLA a court could easily find
(at least constructively) that there is a continuing entity.
Under these interpretations of CERCLA, the only way Saraland
II might qualify for the third party defense is if the CERCLA
responsibility of Saraland I falls exclusively on the selling partners.
In that case, Saraland II would not assume CERCLA responsibility
as a successor and would only face potential CERCLA responsibility as the current owner (where the third party defense could theo32
retically apply),
Similarly, the hidden succession issues in the Redwing II ruling
that the general partners in Saraland II satisfy the third party defense are crucial. To reach this result (upholding the defense), the
Redwing I court implicitly rejects attaching CERCLA responsibility
to the partnership interests. If the court had done otherwise, the
panel would have had to find a direct contractual link between
Roar and a responsible party under CERCLA and the defense
would have failed. 3 Instead, it appears from the panel's comment suggesting that the incoming partner might be insulated from
preexisting responsibility that they believed that Saraland II was a
continuation of Saraland I; consequently there could be an "incoming" partner. 4 Unfortunately, the Redwing I court did not expressly state this conclusion, leaving unresolved exactly how this
succession is supposed to work.
All in all, the unresolved succession questions are important
because, as the analysis here shows, when the hidden issues are
revealed it appears that the Redwing I and Redwing II courts have

are merely saying that the drafters of CERCLA were not blind to the universal rule that
'corporation' includes a successor corporation resulting from a merger and that the drafters
intended 'corporation' to be given its usual meaning.").
232. If Saraland II was considered the successor to Saraland I, it could not qualify for
the third party defense because this succession would be at least an indirect contractual
link. However, even if the lack of technical succession had been upheld, there are presumably still direct contractual links between Saraland II and Saraland I arising from the
transfer of title to the property. Further, there are definitely indirect links since Saraland II
took over operations for Saraland I under the same name. Therefore, it is not clear how
the third party defense could ever be satisfied here.
233. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Redwing 11 ruling
that Roar qualified for the third party defense because, in part, there were no contractual
links with responsible parties).
234. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (suggesting by implication that
there was at least constructively a continuing partnership so that there was an issue about
whether the incoming general partners were insulated from preexisting liabilities).
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opposing views as to how the succession between Saraland I and
Saraland II should be treated. Judge Hand appears to have found
no succession when he implied that Saraland II might qualify for
the third party defense, while the Redwing II court implicitly found
at least constructive succession. Since qualifying for a defense is a
critical element in analyzing CERCLA responsibility, these unresolved issues should be more clearly analyzed in future applications
of CERCLA to limited partnerships, both for the sake of clarity
and to avoid incorrect applications of the third party defense.
B. Lessons of Redwing II For Applying CERCLA to LLCs
The rulings of Redwing II on how to apply CERCLA to limited partnerships partially resolve the question of how CERCLA will
apply to the increasingly popular business entity, the LLC, and its
owners (called "members").235 While not all the issues raised can
be answered, the rulings and their rationales suggest how LLCs
will be treated under CERCLA, at least in the Eleventh Circuit. To
the extent this decision is influential in other circuits, these lessons
will decrease the uncertainty as to how LLCs that own and develop environmentally questionable property like brownfields will be
treated.
The LLC is essentially a hybrid between the corporate and
partnership form. While it offers all of its members corporate-like
liability protection for the acts of the LLC, it is treated as a partnership for tax purposes. 6 In form, the LLC is similar to the
limited partnership since both are governed by detailed statutory
law, both operate pursuant to an operating agreement that spells
out the duties of each member or partner, and both are covered
exclusively by partnership tax law. 7 The biggest difference be-

235. See, e.g., Richard M. Horwood, Limited Liability Companies Provide New Planning
Options, 21 EST. PLAN. 266, 266 (1994).
236. See id. at 266-67. According to Horwood
As a hybrid form, the LLC combines the liability protection of a corporation
with the structuring and management ease of a partnership. Although LLCs
have existed in certain states since the late 1970s, they were not generally
considered viable entities until 1988 when the IRS ruled that LLCs may be
taxed as partnerships rather than corporations. Thus, all items of income, gain,
loss, credit, and deduction "flow through" to the owners, called "members," of
the LLC.
Id.
237. See id. at 267-68.
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tween LLCs and limited partnerships is how they provide limited
liability. In the limited partnership, there must be a general partner
who is responsible for the liabilities of the partnership. By contrast,
all members of the LLC are protected by limited liability, regardless of their involvement in operations."'
Applying the rules of Redwing II to LLCs, the first issue is
whether state LLC law should govern the issue of owner responsibility under CERCLA, or whether a federal standard should be
created. Here, an application of Kimbell Foods test would probably
reach the result that state law should be respected for the same
reason as in Redwing 11.29 While there is less history surrounding LLCs than limited partnerships, there is substantial uniformity
in implementation across states, so state law will probably be respected. 2" This would suggest that LLC members will be considered to own only a personal property interest, and not to own what
the LLC owns. Consequently, members should not be considered
owners under § 9607(a)(1).24
Another issue with a clear answer is that LLC members' direct
responsibility as operators will be tested under the Jacksonville
Electric actual control test, since the Redwing II court applied this
test in all of their considerations of operator responsibility. 242 As
discussed above, it is a bit problematic that the corporate operator
test applies to other entities, since the factors considered are derived from the corporate context.24 3 But since LLCs provide limited liability protection similar to corporations, the corporate operator test is less objectionable when applied to LLCs than limited
partnerships because there is no ready statutory alternative for a

238. See id. at 272.
239. See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Kimbell Foods test
for deciding when to follow state law and when to develop federal common law).
240. See SAGEr & ScHlwDEz'KY, supra note 10, at §§ 3.08, 3.08[2][d] (noting that
all states have adopted LLC legislation in some form and that a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act has been drafted and submitted for approval by the American Bar Association).
241. This is the logical extension of the strong statements in Redwing I and Redwing 1I
that, under state partnership law, the partner does not own what the partnership owns. See
supra notes 125, 148 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing Redwing Irs implication
that Jacksonville Electric applies to all questions of operator responsibility).
243. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (discussing how the control test
from limited partnership law is preferable to the Jacksonville Electric standard in the
limited partner-as-operator context).
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control test in that case (unlike with limited partnerships). 2"
Thus, given the similarities between the blanket liability protection
offered by corporations and LLCs, the corporate operator test is
likely to carry over to LLCs, regardless of the persuasive force of
the Redwing I ruling that applies the corporate test to all entities.
Finally, Redwing II does not provide much guidance regarding
the indirect responsibility of LLC members since there is no statu245
tory scheme that a court could adopt as a veil-piercing test.
The Redwing H ruling that state law governs veil piercing, will not
help since there is no statutorily defined veil-piercing test under
LLC law.246 This uncertainty is quite similar to the issue that the
Redwing II court sidestepped when it declined to consider what
veil-piercing test would apply to general partners in a limited partnership who were insulated from preexisting liabilities.247 The
most likely resolution of this uncertainty is that the veil-piercing
test from the corporate context will be applied to LLCs because of
the similarity between the entities in offering blanket liability protection. 2' But to the extent that LLC veil-piercing tests are later
developed under state law, the principles derived in Redwing II
suggest that these rules should then apply to indirect CERCLA
responsibility.
Overall, the fact that Redwing II can be readily applied to
unresolved CERCLA issues in the LLC context is a notable
strength of the case. There is now persuasive authority for respecting state LLC law in applying CERCLA. Also, the Redwing II rule
that the corporate operator test applies to all considerations of
operator responsibility answers the question of how the all-important operator responsibility test will apply to LLCs in the Eleventh
Circuit. These two decisions are good news for members of LLCs
who are essentially just investors, because in the Eleventh Circuit

244. See Horwood, supra note 235, at 267 (discussing how LLCs offer limited liability
to all members regardless of the degree to which they participate in management).
245. See id.

246. See SARGENT & SctwmzKy, supra note 10, at § 3.08[2][d] ("[W]e do not generally know when the veil of an LLC might be pierced and its members held liable for
its obligations.").
247. The similarity is that there is no statutory control test for when a general partner
loses his liability protection because this partner is ordinarily liable for all debts and
obligations of the partnership. Consequently, a test must be created here as it must be for
LLCs. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the liability of a general
partner).
248. See generally supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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they would not be considered owners or operators. The final question, which liability veil-piercing test will apply to LLCs, remains
an unresolved issue. A resolution of this issue is critical to the
application of CERCLA to LLCs.
CONCLUSION

Both the Redwing I and Redwing II cases are noteworthy for
their rulings on the application of CERCLA to limited partnerships.
The most important aspect of the cases is probably the respect
given to state limited partnership law. This is an encouraging development in the evolution of CERCLA because recognition of
well-developed state law adds a measure of predictability that is
too often absent in the application of CERCLA. The Redwing
courts' recognition of the need for predictability suggests that the
legitimate expectations of investors may begin to enter into
CERCLA analysis as a countervailing consideration to the remedial
purpose paradigm.2 49
The Redwing cases are not all good news for limited partnerships or other business entities, however. The fact that the actual
control test from the corporate context was applied to limited partners, instead of a test based on the RULPA control factors, suggests that the present divergence in operator tests will spread from
the corporate context to noncorporate entities. Furthermore, the
choice of the corporate veil-piercing standard may lead, in jurisdictions with broad operator responsibility tests, to an undermining of
the liability protection otherwise given to limited partners. If the
all-important operator responsibility from the corporate context
applies to all business entities, courts will still have considerable
flexibility in finding responsible parties. This means that predicting
CERCLA liability will still be a risky proposition for real estate
investors operating in noncorporate forms.
It is also important to remember that Redwing I and Redwing
1I were decided in a setting where the major, if not only, polluter

249. See, e.g., supra note 165 and accompanying text (presenting the Redwing I
court's recognition of investment backed expectations). Further, Judge Hand made clear
that investors' attempts to limit their liability will not be considered as a negative factor
in determining ultimate CERCLA responsibility. See Redwing I, 875 F.Supp. at 1558 ("It
is hubris for Redwing to assert in effect that the Hutton defendants' efforts at dealing
with, and protecting themselves legally from, the mess Redwing created make the Hutton
defendants liable to Redwing. This court will not turn such absurdity into law:).
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was already a responsible person who was able to pay for the
cleanup. Since there was a "deep pocket" polluter already on the
hook, the courts had the luxury of applying traditional legal analysis instead of stretching their interpretations to bring in persons
who were financially viable. If Redwing was no longer a viable
corporation, the courts would have presumably been less likely to
excuse parties on grounds like the third party defense. Thus, the
rules of Redwing I and Redwing H may prove less influential in
cases where the only viable party is otherwise protected from responsibility.
Notwithstanding this caveat, the Redwing cases provide helpful
guidance as to how CERCLA will apply to new entities like LLCs.
Because the cases also demonstrate the fundamental uncertainties
still surrounding critically important interpretations of CERCLA
(e.g., retroactivity, how defenses to liability should work), however,
it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the influence of the
Redwing decisions beyond this measured contribution to predictability for noncorporate entities.
DEREK MOHR

